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I. INTRODUCTION
The Texas Supreme Court has long held that mandamus relief in that
court is an “extraordinary remedy, not issued as a matter of right, but at
the discretion of the court.”1 Additionally, the supreme court has stated
that while mandamus “can correct clear errors in exceptional cases and
afford appropriate guidance to the law without the disruption and burden
of interlocutory appeal,” appellate courts must be mindful that “the bene-
fits of mandamus review are easily lost by overuse.”2 Consistent with
those statements, during the Survey period of January 1, 2014, through
December 31, 2015, the supreme court granted mandamus relief only in
limited circumstances. This article surveys the twenty-four published
Texas Supreme Court mandamus opinions delivered during that time pe-
riod, with particular focus on the twenty-one opinions in that group that
involved the availability of mandamus relief to correct a clear abuse of
discretion by a lower court when there is no adequate remedy by appeal.
The purpose of this article is to identify and describe the approach and
methods of analysis employed by the supreme court in recent mandamus
opinions.
In Part II of this article, we briefly describe the fundamentals of the
jurisdictional bases and standards of proof for mandamus. Part III pro-
vides a statistical analysis of mandamus cases in the Texas Supreme Court
during the past two fiscal years, 2014 and 2015. In Part IV, we categorize
and summarize each of the twenty-one mandamus opinions issued by the
supreme court during the survey period in which a party alleged a clear
abuse of discretion by a lower court and no adequate remedy by appeal.
Those summaries offer an examination and comparison of how manda-
mus review is addressed in each particular category. Part V focuses on the
supreme court’s varying approaches to addressing the adequacy of an ap-
pellate remedy in those twenty-one cases. Our analysis, presented in a
chart format, shows that while it is not unusual for the supreme court to
provide only a conclusory statement, or no mention at all, about the ele-
ment of adequacy of an appellate remedy, the outcomes appear consis-
tent with prior cases involving analogous fact situations. In Part VI, we
describe the supreme court’s mandamus decisions during the survey pe-
riod that fall outside the parameters of Part V. Finally, Part VII concludes
this article with observations based on the foregoing parts.
1. In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 374 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)).
2. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 138.
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II. MANDAMUS FUNDAMENTALS
The basis for jurisdiction over writs of mandamus in the intermediate
appellate courts of Texas is statutory. Specifically, § 22.221 of the Texas
Government Code provides the following:
(a) Each court of appeals or a justice of a court of appeals may issue
a writ of mandamus and all other writs necessary to enforce the
jurisdiction of the court.
(b) Each court of appeals for a court of appeals district may issue all
writs of mandamus, agreeable to the principles of law regulating
those writs, against a . . . judge of a district or county court in the
court of appeals district; or . . . judge of a district court who is
acting as a magistrate at a court of inquiry . . . in the court of
appeals district.3
Additionally, other statutes provide for mandamus in the courts of ap-
peals respecting specific matters, such as election duties.4
The Texas Supreme Court’s mandamus jurisdiction stems from the
Texas Constitution and statutes, and has been described by that court as
broad.5 In addition to mandamus jurisdiction concurrent with the courts
of appeals pursuant to § 22.221 and statutes allowing for mandamus as to
specific matters,6 the supreme court possesses general original jurisdic-
tion to issue writs of mandamus pursuant to Article V, Section 3(a) of the
Texas Constitution.7 Also, § 22.002(a) of the Government Code provides
in part that the supreme court or a justice of the supreme court may issue
writs of mandamus “agreeable to the principles of law regulating those
writs” against “a statutory county court judge, a statutory probate court
judge, a district judge, a court of appeals or a justice of a court of appeals,
or any [other] officer of state government except the governor, the court
of criminal appeals, or a judge of the court of criminal appeals.”8 Further,
the supreme court or, in vacation, a justice of that court, may issue a writ
of mandamus to “compel a statutory county court judge, a statutory pro-
bate court judge, or a district judge to proceed to trial and judgment in a
3. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(a), (b) (West 2015).
4. See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061 (West 2015) (“The supreme court or a
court of appeals may issue a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any duty
imposed by law in connection with the holding of an election or a political party conven-
tion, regardless of whether the person responsible for performing the duty is a public
officer.”).
5. See In re Dow, 481 S.W.3d 215, 224 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In
re Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 373.
6. Unlike § 273.061 of the Election Code, see Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 273.061 (West
2015), certain Texas statutes allow for mandamus relief only in the supreme court. See, e.g.,
In re Nestle USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 610, 617 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus
review of constitutionality of franchise tax statute was proper where legislature used lan-
guage that gave supreme court power for such review).
7. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a). Specifically, that section authorizes the supreme
court to issue writs of mandamus in two instances: (1) “as may be necessary to enforce its
jurisdiction” and (2) “in such cases as may be specified” by the Legislature. See In re Dow,
481 S.W.3d at 224.
8. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a) (West 2015).
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case” agreeable to the principles and usages of law.9 Finally, § 22.002(c)
provides:
Only the supreme court has the authority to issue a writ of manda-
mus . . . against any of the officers of the executive departments of
the government of this state to order or compel the performance of a
judicial, ministerial, or discretionary act or duty that, by state law,
the officer or officers are authorized to perform.10
Rule 52 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governs mandamus
proceedings in both the supreme court and the courts of appeals.11 A
petition seeking mandamus relief must state the basis of the court’s juris-
diction.12 If the supreme court and the court of appeals have concurrent
jurisdiction, the petition must be presented first to the court of appeals
unless there is a compelling reason not to do so, which reason must be
stated in the petition.13 Further, failure to adhere to the other procedural
provisions of Rule 52 may result in denial of relief.14
Despite mandamus not being an equitable remedy, a court issues a writ
of mandamus under equitable principles.15 “[A] clear failure by the trial
court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of
discretion, and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ.”16
On appeal, a court will issue mandamus “to correct such an abuse of dis-
cretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal.”17 “The adequacy
of an appellate remedy must be determined by balancing the benefits of
mandamus review against the detriments.”18 “An appellate remedy is ‘ad-
equate’ when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the
detriments.”19 “When the benefits outweigh the detriments, appellate
courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is adequate.”20 And
the specific facts of each case determine whether the appellate remedy is
adequate.21
9. Id. § 22.002(b).
10. Id. § 22.002(c).
11. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.
12. See id. 52.3(e).
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 793 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); In re
Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 758–59 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding); In re Cullar,
320 S.W.3d 560, 567–68 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding).
15. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceed-
ing) (quoting Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex.1993) (orig.
proceeding)).
16. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); accord In re
Conner, 458 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re Columbia
Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 218 (Tex. 2009) (orig.
proceeding).
17. In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d at 535 (citing In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136).
18. In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceed-
ing) (quoting In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding)).
19. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136.
20. Id.
21. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
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III. MANDAMUS STATISTICS
Mandamus statistics for the Texas Supreme Court’s 2014 fiscal year,
which ran from September 1, 2013, to August 31, 2014, show that 219 new
petitions for writ of mandamus were filed in the supreme court during
that period.22 Dispositions were made in 216 mandamus cases.23 The peti-
tion for writ of mandamus was denied in 81.9%, or 177, of those disposi-
tions and conditionally granted in 5.5%, or twelve, of those dispositions.24
During the 2015 fiscal year, which ran from September 1, 2014, to August
31, 2015, 220 new petitions for writ of mandamus were filed in the su-
preme court and dispositions were made in 225 mandamus cases.25 In
72%, or 162, of those dispositions, the petition for writ of mandamus was
denied, and in 7.55%, or seventeen, of those dispositions, the petition was
conditionally granted.26 When compared with statistics for 2010–2013,27
these figures show that the supreme court has consistently made manda-
mus relief available only in limited circumstances and that the percentage
of cases in which the supreme court granted relief has not varied substan-
tially over the past six years.
In the twenty-four mandamus opinions issued by the supreme court
during the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court granted petition for
writ of mandamus in whole or in part in seventeen of those cases.28 The
supreme court denied petition for writ of mandamus in six of those cases
and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in one case. Oral argument was
heard by the supreme court in eleven of those twenty-four cases.29
22. See generally Supreme Court Activity Detail: FY 2014, TEX. COURTS ONLINE, http:/
/www.txcourts.gov/media/652335/SC-Activity-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM8N-VY3J]
(last visited Oct. 18, 2016).
23. See id.
24. See id. Petitions otherwise disposed of were dismissed, abated, or struck. See id.
25. See generally Supreme Court Activity Detail: FY 2015, TEX. COURTS ONLINE, http:/
/www.txcourts.gov/media/1359925/2-SC-Activity-2015-revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2S9-
JSA3] (last visited Oct. 18, 2016).
26. See id. The other thirty-six petitions disposed of were dismissed, abated, or struck.
See id.
27. The percentages of petitions for writ of mandamus in the supreme court condition-
ally granted in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively, were 10.4%, 8.55%, 6.3%, and
2.25%. See Douglas S. Lang & Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions
of the Texas Supreme Court, 1 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 101, 103 n.16 (2014), smu-
lawreview.law.smu.edu/getattachment/Journals/TX-Survey/2015-Texas-Survey/Mandamus-
(1).pdf; Douglas S. Lang & Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of
the Texas Supreme Court, 66 SMU L. REV. 1155, 1156–57 (2013).
28. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand
down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand
down an opinion as in any other case.”). The supreme court has not specifically stated its
criteria for deciding whether to hand down an opinion when denying relief. We note that
among the six opinions described above in which relief was denied, three included dissents
or concurrences. See State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); In re
State Bd. for Educator Certification, 452 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding); In re
Ford Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding). One case decided an issue
of first impression. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). None
of those six opinions were per curiam.
29. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(b)(4) (“[T]he court may set the case for oral argument.”).
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IV. SUBJECT MATTER CATEGORIES OF RECENT TEXAS
SUPREME COURT MANDAMUS CASES INVOLVING ALLEGED
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY LOWER COURT AND NO
ADEQUATE REMEDY BY APPEAL
A. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In re Whataburger Restaurants LP30 involved a determination of
whether the facts and circumstances supported the trial court’s granting
of a motion for new trial. A lawsuit was filed by a restaurant patron, Jose
Acuna, against Whataburger Restaurants LP (Whataburger) for injuries
arising from a fight. During the jury selection process, potential jurors
completed a written questionnaire that asked whether they had “ever
been a party to a lawsuit.”31 The trial court rendered a take-nothing judg-
ment based on the jury’s 10-2 verdict in Whataburger’s favor.
Acuna filed a motion for new trial in which he asserted that one of the
jurors who had joined in the majority verdict, Georgina Chavez, “had
committed misconduct by failing to disclose in her questionnaire that she
had been a defendant in two prior [debt] collection suits and a bank-
ruptcy action.”32 The trial court granted Acuna’s motion for new trial
based on its findings that Chavez did not complete her juror question-
naire correctly, and that her “mistake was material and . . . it resulted in
probable injury.”33
Following the denial of mandamus relief in the court of appeals,
Whataburger sought mandamus review in the Texas Supreme Court. The
supreme court stated in part that (1) “[a] writ of mandamus shall issue to
correct a clear abuse of discretion committed by a trial court in granting a
new trial”;34 and (2) “[a] trial court does not abuse its discretion so long
as its stated reason for granting a new trial is legally appropriate and spe-
cific enough to indicate that the trial court derived the reasons from the
particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand.”35 Additionally,
the supreme court noted that “[t]o warrant a new trial for jury miscon-
duct, the movant must establish (1) that the misconduct occurred, (2) it
was material, and (3) probably caused injury.”36 The supreme court ob-
served that Acuna’s attorney testified in the trial court that if Chavez had
testified she had been a defendant in prior lawsuits, he would have ques-
tioned her about those suits and struck her as a juror.37 However, the
supreme court stated, “Generally, such testimony about what a person
30. 429 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
31. Id. at 598.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 762 (Tex. 2013)
(orig. proceeding)).
35. Id. The supreme court did not specifically discuss adequacy of an appellate
remedy.
36. Id. (quoting Golden Eagle Archery v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362, 372 (Tex. 2000)).
37. Id. at 599.
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‘would have’ done . . . is speculative and conclusory in the absence of
some evidentiary support.”38
According to the supreme court, the evidence of what Acuna’s attor-
ney actually did supported a contrary conclusion because (1) although
four prospective jurors each disclosed they had been defendants in prior
lawsuits, Acuna’s attorney did not challenge them; (2) one of those four
sat as a juror and joined the majority verdict; and (3) Acuna failed to
provide evidence to suggest Chavez’s experience as a defendant in a law-
suit was meaningfully different from other prospective jurors’ exper-
iences.39 The supreme court concluded that “[b]ecause the record
contains no competent evidence that Chavez’s nondisclosure resulted in
probable injury, and the only competent evidence supports that it did not,
the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial.”40 Mandamus
relief was conditionally granted by the supreme court and the trial court
was ordered to withdraw its order and render judgment on the verdict.41
In re Health Care Unlimited, Inc.42 addressed the issue of whether the
granting of a motion for new trial based on a juror’s communications with
a party’s representative was improper. Belinda Valdemar died in an auto-
mobile accident that involved a vehicle driven by an employee of Health
Care Unlimited (HCU).43 Valdemar’s estate and survivors (collectively,
Valdemar’s Survivors) sued HCU, alleging HCU was vicariously liable.
The jury found that the HCU employee was not acting within the scope
of her employment and thus HCU was not vicariously liable for her
negligence.
“Valdemar’s Survivors moved for a mistrial, alleging that the presiding
juror, Dominique Alegria, had engaged in juror misconduct by communi-
cating with another HCU employee, Sonny Villarreal, during breaks
while the jury was deliberating.”44 At a hearing on that motion in the trial
court, Alegria and Villarreal admitted they had telephone conversations
during the time the jury was deliberating, but stated that their discussions
involved only preparations for an approaching church retreat.45 Further,
Alegria denied seeing or noticing Villarreal at the trial.46
The trial court granted the motion for mistrial, treating it as a motion
for new trial.47 In its order, the trial court found (1) Villarreal “sat behind
and conferred with HCU’s counsel during the evidential part of the trial
‘in the full view of the jury’”; and (2) Alegria “violated the court’s in-
structions by communicating with an HCU representative during the trial
38. Id.
39. See id. at 599–600.
40. Id. at 600.
41. See id.
42. 429 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
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of the case.”48 The trial court concluded in the order that “[i]n light of the
totality of the circumstances, the integrity of the verdict rendered in this
cause has been compromised and in the interest of justice, a new trial
should be granted.”49
After unsuccessfully seeking mandamus relief in the court of appeals,
HCU filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court.
The supreme court noted that it had concluded in previous cases that an
appellate court may “conduct a merits-based review of a trial court’s or-
der granting a new trial” and “evaluate the correctness of the stated rea-
son.”50 Additionally, the supreme court observed that pursuant to Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 327(a), a movant for a new trial based on jury
misconduct must establish that (1) “the misconduct occurred, (2) it was
material, and (3) it probably caused injury.”51 As to those requirements,
the supreme court stated that “‘[t]o show probable injury, there must be
some indication in the record that the alleged misconduct most likely
caused a juror to vote differently than he would otherwise have done on
one or more issues vital to the judgment.’”52 According to the supreme
court, the record revealed that rather than applying that standard, “the
trial court essentially used an ‘appearance of impropriety’ standard” in
granting the motion in question.53 The supreme court reasoned that be-
cause “there is no evidence that the communications [between Alegria
and Villarreal], although prohibited by the trial court, were related to the
trial or probably affected its outcome,” the facts did not support a finding
of probable injury as required by Rule 327.54 Accordingly, the supreme
court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion and mandamus
relief was appropriate.55
B. REFUSAL TO DISMISS
1. Forum Non Conveniens
In re Ford Motor Co.56 presented a novel fact situation that required
the Texas Supreme Court to interpret the definition of plaintiff in the
“Texas-resident exception” to the Texas forum non conveniens statute.57
The case arose when a tire burst on a Ford vehicle being driven in Mexico
48. Id. at 601–02.
49. Id. at 602.
50. Id. (citing In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 757-58 (Tex.
2013) (orig. proceeding)).
51. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(a) and Golden Eagle Archery v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d
362, 372 (Tex. 2000)).
52. Id. at 603 (quoting Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Tex. 1985)).
53. Id.
54. Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 327.
55. In re Health Care Unlimited, 429 S.W.3d at 600. The adequacy of a remedy by
appeal was not specifically addressed by the supreme court.
56. 442 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (court’s opinion authored by Justice
Willett, while dissenting opinions were rendered by Justices Johnson and Boyd).
57. Id. at 268 (That exception “allows plaintiffs who are legal residents of Texas to
anchor a case in a Texas forum even if forum non conveniens would otherwise favor dis-
missal.”); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (West 2015).
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by Juan Tueme Mendez. Juan was injured and the passenger, Juan’s
brother Cesar Tueme Mendez, was killed.58
Juan, who was not a legal resident of Texas, sued his deceased
brother’s estate in Hidalgo County, where Cesar’s estate was being
administered. Juan alleged in his petition that Cesar had failed to
properly maintain the vehicle and the tires. Cesar’s estate in turn
filed a third-party claim against Ford and Michelin, alleging defective
design and negligence.59
Additionally, several family members of Cesar, who were legal residents
of Texas, intervened in the lawsuit as wrongful death beneficiaries, assert-
ing claims against Ford. Several months later, Juan amended his petition
to add Ford as a defendant in his personal injury claim.
Ford filed a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, which
was denied by the trial court. In a petition for writ of mandamus to the
court of appeals, Ford contended that the denial amounted to an abuse of
discretion because the intervening beneficiaries were not plaintiffs under
the Texas-resident exception.60 After that relief was denied, Ford sought
mandamus relief in the supreme court. Ford did not dispute that (1) Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 71.051 states the law of Texas re-
specting forum non conveniens;61 (2) subsection (e) of that statute creates
an exception to the forum non conveniens rule for plaintiffs who are legal
residents of Texas;62 and (3) subsection (h)(2) of that statute defines
plaintiff.63 Rather, Ford argued none of the wrongful death beneficiaries
58. See In re Ford, 442 S.W.3d at 268.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b) (“If a court of this state, on
written motion of a party, finds that in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the
parties a claim or action to which this section applies would be more properly heard in a
forum outside this state, the court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens and shall stay or dismiss the claim or action.”).
62. Id. § 71.051(e). Under that subsection, “[t]he court may not stay or dismiss a plain-
tiff’s claim under Subsection (b) if the plaintiff is a legal resident of this state” and “[i]f an
action involves both plaintiffs who are legal residents of this state and plaintiffs who are
not, the court may not stay or dismiss the action under Subsection (b) if the plaintiffs who
are legal residents of this state are properly joined in the action and the action arose out of
a single occurrence.” Act of May 29, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 424 § 1, Sec. 71.051(e) Tex.
Sess. Law. Serv. (West 1997) (amended 2015) current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM.
CODE ANN. § 71.051(e) (West 2015). Subsection (e) was amended subsequent to court’s
decision.
63. “Subsection 71.051(h)(2) defines plaintiff as follows:
“Plaintiff” means a party seeking recovery of damages for personal injury or
wrongful death. In a cause of action in which a party seeks recovery of dam-
ages for personal injury to or the wrongful death of another person, “plain-
tiff” includes both that other person and the party seeking such recovery.
The term does not include a counterclaimant, cross-claimant, or third-party
plaintiff or a person who is assigned a cause of action for personal injury, or
who accepts an appointment as a personal representative in a wrongful death
action, in bad faith for purposes of affecting in any way the application of this
section.
Act of May 29, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 424 § 1, Sec. 71.051(h)(2), Tex. Sess. Law. Serv.
(West 1997) (amended 2015) current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.051(h)(2) (West 2015). Subsection (h) was amended subsequent to court’s decision.
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qualified as a plaintiff under the statutory definition for two reasons: (1)
“the beneficiaries are third-party plaintiffs expressly excluded by the defi-
nition”; and (2) “the wrongful death beneficiaries are combined with the
decedent into one single plaintiff” and the legal residency of the dece-
dent, who in this case was not a legal resident of Texas, controls.64
Empathizing with Ford, the supreme court recognized that Ford “does
not have an adequate remedy by appeal” because “[w]e have held that no
adequate remedy by appeal can rectify an erroneous denial of a forum
non conveniens motion.”65 But after a lengthy analysis that focused on
the language and intent of the forum non conveniens statute, the supreme
court rejected both of Ford’s arguments and reasoned, “the intervening
wrongful-death beneficiaries are distinct plaintiffs within the meaning of
the Texas-resident exception.”66 Consequently, the supreme court denied
mandamus relief, concluding that the denial of Ford’s motion to dismiss
did not constitute an abuse of discretion.67
In In re Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC (In re Bridge-
stone),68 the Texas Supreme Court again addressed application of the
Texas-resident exception to the Texas forum non conveniens statute de-
scribed above.69 Specifically, the supreme court faced the issue of
whether that exception applies in a case in which a Texas resident filed
suit as next fried of two nonresident minors.70 The two minors (the chil-
dren) and their parents resided in Mexico when the parents were killed in
a vehicle accident in Mexico. After the parents passed away, “the chil-
dren’s maternal grandparents became the children’s legal guardians by
operation of Mexico law and took custody of the children in Mexico.”71
Even though the children had a legal guardian, the maternal uncle of the
children, a resident of Texas, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against
Bridgestone in Texas as “next friend” of the children. Specifically, he al-
leged a defective tire manufactured by Bridgestone had caused the acci-
dent. Bridgestone moved to dismiss for forum non conveniens, arguing
that the case belonged in Mexico, not Texas. The trial court, however,
denied that motion.
After an unsuccessful effort to obtain mandamus relief in the court of
appeals, Bridgestone filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the supreme
court. Bridgestone contended that Rodriguez’s Texas residency did not
foreclose dismissal for two reasons: (1) “Rodriguez lacked authority to
64. In re Ford, 442 S.W.3d at 270.
65. Id. at 269 (citing In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., 247 S.W.3d 670, 679 (Tex. 2007) (orig.
proceeding)).
66. Id. at 270–84.
67. See id. at 284.
68. 459 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (opinion authored by Justice
Lehrmann).
69. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (West 2015), supra notes 57–67.
70. In re Bridgestone, 459 S.W.3d at 568.
71. Id.
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sue as the children’s next friend because they had a legal guardian”;72 and
(2) “a next friend is not a ‘plaintiff’ whose residency may trigger the
[Texas-resident] exception.”73
First, the supreme court reasoned that although the children’s grand-
parents were recognized as the children’s guardians under the law of
Mexico, they had no authority to sue in that capacity on the children’s
behalf in Texas.74 Therefore, the supreme court concluded, the children
could sue by next friend in Texas.75 Next, the supreme court observed
that (1) the Texas forum non conveniens statute defines plaintiff as “a
party seeking recovery of damages for personal injury or wrongful
death”; and (2) Texas law is well-settled that “[i]n a suit by a ‘next friend,’
the real party plaintiff is the child and not the next friend.”76 Conse-
quently, that court concluded, “a next friend’s legal residency in Texas
does not trigger the forum-non-conveniens statute’s Texas-resident
exception.”77
Despite these conclusions, the supreme court overturned the trial
court’s decision because the forum non conveniens factors mandated dis-
missal.78 That court concluded (1) “the forum-non-conveniens factors
‘clearly and overwhelmingly favor a Mexican forum for resolution of the
dispute’”;79 and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Bridgestone’s motion to dismiss.80 The supreme court conditionally
granted Bridgestone’s petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the
trial court to vacate its order denying Bridgestone’s motion to dismiss and
“set terms and conditions for . . . dismissing [this] action . . . as the inter-
ests of justice may require.”81
2. Want of Prosecution
In the case of In re Conner,82 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
issue of “whether a trial court abuses its discretion by refusing to grant a
motion to dismiss for want of prosecution in the face of unmitigated and
unexplained delay.”83 In 2004, Donald and Crystal Peel filed a lawsuit
against Michael Conner and his employer, IESI Solid Waste Services
(collectively, Conner), alleging injuries from a vehicle accident. The Peels
72. Id. at 569; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 44 (stating in part that “[m]inors . . . who have no
legal guardian may sue and be represented by ‘next friend’”).
73. In re Bridgestone, 459 S.W.3d at 569.
74. Id. at 577.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 572–73 (quoting Garcia v. RC Cola-7-Up Bottling Co., 667 S.W.2d 517, 519
(Tex. 1984)); see also TEX. CIV PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(h)(2) (West 2015).
77. In re Bridgestone, 459 S.W.3d at 573.
78. Id. at 577.
79. Id. (citing In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., 247 S.W.3d 670, 675–76 (Tex. 2007) (orig.
proceeding)).
80. Id. The opinion contains no specific discussion of adequacy of an appellate
remedy.
81. Id.; TEX CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(c).
82. 458 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
83. Id. at 534.
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did not respond to Conner’s timely answer and discovery request.84 The
Peels, however, responded in June 2007, when Conner filed a summary
judgment motion, several months before a trial setting. The trial judge
cancelled the trial setting, but never addressed the motion. In September
2011,
the Peels had taken no other action to advance the case and Conner
moved to dismiss for want of prosecution. The Peels responded that
the delay was due to their counsel’s health issues, but did not indi-
cate when those health issues had occurred. The trial court refused to
dismiss the case.
In October 2013, when the Peels still had done nothing further to
pursue their claims, Conner again moved to dismiss for want of pros-
ecution. At the hearing on that motion, [1] the Peels offered no addi-
tional excuse for their delay . . . [and] [2] Connor cited court records
showing that the Peels’s counsel had appeared in numerous matters
during the prior two years.85
The trial court again declined to grant summary judgment, but rather set
the case for trial and directed the Peels to respond to Conner’s 2004 dis-
covery requests. Conner filed a petition for mandamus relief in the court
of appeals, requesting that the trial court be directed to dismiss the case.
After that relief was denied, Conner filed a petition for writ of mandamus
in the supreme court.
The supreme court stated in part that (1) “a delay of an unreasonable
duration . . . , if not sufficiently explained, will raise a conclusive pre-
sumption of abandonment of the plaintiff’s suit”;86 and (2) “[t]his pre-
sumption justifies the dismissal of a suit under either a court’s inherent
authority or Rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.”87 Further,
the supreme court noted that Rule 165a(2) provides for dismissal for
want of prosecution when a case is “not disposed of within time standards
promulgated by the Supreme Court,” which standards generally require
civil cases to be “brought to trial or final disposition within eighteen
months of the appearance date.”88 The supreme court concluded (1)
“[t]he Peels’ failure to provide good cause for their nearly decade-long
delay mandates dismissal under Rule 165a(2)”; and (2) “[a]bsent any rea-
sonable explanation for the delay, the trial court clearly abused its discre-
tion by disregarding the conclusive presumption of abandonment.”89
Additionally, the supreme court reasoned that “a trial court’s erroneous
refusal to dismiss a case for want of prosecution cannot effectively be
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Callahan v. Staples, 161 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1942) (orig.
proceeding)).
87. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a).
88. In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d at 535 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(2); TEX. R. JUD.
ADMIN. 6.1(b)(1)).
89. Id.
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challenged on appeal.”90 Specifically, the court stated:
A defendant should not be required to incur the delay and expense
of appeal to complain of delay in the trial court. To deny relief by
mandamus permits the very delay dismissal is intended to prevent. In
addition, the danger that a trial will be hampered by stale evidence
and lost or clouded memories is particularly distinct after the delay
in this case.91
Accordingly, the supreme court conditionally granted Conner’s petition
for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to dismiss the case for
want of prosecution.92
3. Direct Action Against Insurer
In In re Essex Insurance Co.,93 the Texas Supreme Court addressed for
the first time whether a plaintiff can maintain a direct action against a
defendant’s liability insurer for a declaratory judgment on coverage
before liability is determined by agreement or judgment. Rafael Zuniga
sued San Diego Tortilla (SDT) after incurring injury to his hand while
operating a tortilla machine at an SDT facility.94 Essex Insurance Com-
pany (Essex), which had issued a commercial general liability policy in-
suring SDT, investigated the accident and “concluded that the policy
[did] not cover Zuniga’s claims because Zuniga was an SDT employee at
the time of the accident” and therefore a policy exclusion concerning
bodily injury to employees applied.95 Zuniga and SDT, however, dis-
agreed, asserting instead that Zuniga was working at SDT as an indepen-
dent contractor. Essex maintained its position that Zuniga was an
employee, but “agreed to defend SDT under a reservation of its right to
refuse to indemnify SDT against any judgment.”96
“After Essex rejected Zuniga’s offer to settle his claims against SDT
for the policy limits,” Zuniga added Essex as a defendant and sought “a
declaration that the policy require[d] Essex to indemnify SDT for its lia-
bility to Zuniga . . . . Essex moved to dismiss Zuniga’s claims [against
Essex as ‘baseless’] under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a.”97 Specifi-
cally, Essex argued that (1) under Texas’s “no direct action” rule, an in-
jured party cannot sue the tortfeasor’s insurer directly until the
tortfeasor’s liability has been finally determined by agreement or judg-
ment; and (2) the “no direct action” rule, Zuniga’s lack of standing, and a
lack of ripeness barred Zuniga from suing Essex until SDT’s liability to




93. 450 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
94. Id. at 525.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a).
98. Id. at 525–26.
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After being denied mandamus relief in the court of appeals, Essex filed
a petition for writ of mandamus in the supreme court. In response,
Zuniga argued that (1) his claims against Essex did not violate the “no
direct action” rule because he sought merely a declaration, as opposed to
a money judgment; and (2) the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act ex-
pressly permitted him to seek such relief.100 But the supreme court (1)
rejected both of those arguments, citing policy considerations that in-
cluded avoiding prejudice and conflicts of interest; and (2) concluded that
the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to dismiss
Zuniga’s claims.101
After finding that the trial court abused its discretion, the supreme
court addressed whether Essex had met the mandamus requirement of no
adequate remedy by appeal.102 The supreme court observed that “[t]he
adequacy of an appellate remedy must be determined by balancing the
benefits of mandamus review against the detriments.”103 Further, the
court stated:
Balancing these interests, we have previously held that “mandamus
relief is appropriate to ‘spare private parties and the public the time
and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly
conducted proceedings.’” In re John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy
Mem’l Found., 315 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Tex. 2010) (quoting In re Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004)). In light of
the conflict of interest and prejudice that we have noted above, we
conclude that mandamus relief is appropriate to spare the parties
and the public the time and money spent on fatally flawed
proceedings.104
Accordingly, the supreme court conditionally granted the mandamus re-
lief requested by Essex.105
4. Workers’ Compensation
In re Crawford & Co. required the Texas Supreme Court to assess
whether numerous claims filed by an injured worker fell within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Division of Workers’ Compensation of the Texas
Department of Insurance (the Division).106 Glenn Johnson suffered em-
99. See id. at 526.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 527–28.
102. Id. at 528.
103. Id. (quoting In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig.
proceeding)).
104. Id. In a footnote, the supreme court noted that Essex also asserted it need not
demonstrate that it lacks an adequate remedy on appeal to obtain mandamus relief be-
cause the trial court “exceeded its jurisdiction” by denying Essex’s Rule 91a motion. Id. at
526 n.2. The supreme court, however, stated it need not reach that argument because Essex
demonstrated it does not have an adequate remedy by appeal. Id.
105. See id.
106. In re Crawford & Co., 458 S.W.3d 920, 921 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (orig. proceed-
ing); see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 402.001(b) (West 2015) (establishing “division of work-
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ployment-related injuries that entitled him to lifetime workers’ compen-
sation benefits. But disputes over the details of his benefits eventually led
to a contested case hearing. In a separate proceeding, Johnson and his
wife filed a lawsuit against his employer’s workers’ compensation insur-
ance provider, its claims services contractors, and the claims services con-
tractors’ employee Patsy Hogan (collectively, Crawford). According to
the Johnsons, “‘[r]ather than manage the claim’ and adjust it ‘in a fair and
reasonable manner,’” Crawford delayed and denied benefits that the
Johnsons were entitled to receive.107 In their lawsuit, the Johnsons (1)
asserted numerous causes of action, including tort claims,108 contract
claims,109 and statutory claims under the Texas Insurance Code and the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act;110 and (2) sought relief, including
actual damages for physical and other injuries, exemplary damages, statu-
tory damages, and “injunctive relief prohibiting Crawford from continu-
ing to engage in such ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct.”111
The Johnsons acknowledged in the trial court that claims for workers’
compensation benefits must be pursued through the administrative pro-
cedures of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act.112 They, however, con-
tended in their pleading that their claims could be pursued in the courts
without exhausting the Act’s administrative remedies because such claims
were for “additional, independent, and ‘unrelated’ damages.”113 Craw-
ford disagreed and filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for sum-
mary judgment. Specifically, Crawford argued that the Division had
“exclusive jurisdiction over all of the Johnsons’ claims because they arose
out of the workers’ compensation claims-handling process.”114 “The trial
court dismissed the Johnsons’ claims for breach of the common law duty
of good faith and fair dealing and for violations of the Texas Insurance
Code but refused to dismiss the other claims.”115 After the court of ap-
peals refused to grant Crawford’s mandamus relief, Crawford sought
mandamus relief in the supreme court.
The supreme court conditionally granted Crawford’s mandamus re-
lief.116 In its analysis, the supreme court noted the rule applied in its pre-
vious case, Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ruttiger:117 “[T]he [Workers’
ers’ compensation” as a division within the Texas Department of Insurance to administer
and operate the workers’ compensation system of the state of Texas).
107. In re Crawford, 458 S.W.3d at 922.
108. See id. at 922. (The Johnsons’ tort claims included “negligence; gross negligence;
negligent, fraudulent, and intentional misrepresentation; fraud; fraud by non-disclosure;
fraudulent inducement; intentional infliction of emotional distress; malicious prosecution;
and conspiracy”).
109. See id. (Contract claims asserted by the Johnsons included “breach of contract;
quantum meruit; and breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing”).
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 401.001–419.007 (West 2015).
113. In re Crawford, 458 S.W.3d at 922.
114. Id. at 922–23.
115. Id. at 923.
116. Id. at 928–29.
117. 381 S.W.3d 430, 431 (Tex. 2012).
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Compensation Act] provides the exclusive process and remedies for
claims arising out of a carrier’s investigation, handling, or settling of a
claim for workers’ compensation benefits.”118 Further, the supreme court
stated, “in assessing whether a claim falls within the Division’s exclusive
jurisdiction, courts must look at the substance of the claim.”119 After an
analysis in which it addressed the substance of each of the Johnsons’
claims, the supreme court concluded that all of those claims arose out of
Crawford’s investigation, handling, and settling of the Johnsons’ claim for
workers’ compensation benefits and therefore fell within the Division’s
exclusive jurisdiction.120 The supreme court stated that “[b]ecause the
Johnsons failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Act
prior to filing this action, the trial court lacked jurisdiction and should
have dismissed it.”121 And thus, the supreme court concluded Crawford
was entitled to mandamus relief.122
5. Enforcement of Settlement
In the case of In re Vaishangi,123 the Texas Supreme Court addressed
whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement
when the defendant moved to enforce the agreement nearly one year af-
ter the case’s dismissal. A group of several entities and individuals (col-
lectively, Vaishangi) purchased “a commercial real estate lien note and
related security instruments” from Southwestern National Bank (the
Bank) to finance a hotel.124 Subsequently, “the Bank accelerated the note
and began proceedings to foreclose on the hotel property.”125 In re-
sponse, Vaishangi filed a lawsuit in Harris County district court (the trial
court) alleging breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure.126 The par-
ties settled and had the agreement memorialized in a “handwritten Rule
11 agreement” that was signed by the parties and the trial court.127 In the
agreement, Vaishangi “agree[d] to execute” a certain loan-modification
agreement.128 On that same day that the parties memorialized the agree-
ment, the Bank filed the Rule 11 agreement together with an unsigned
118. In re Crawford, 458 S.W.3d at 925–26.
119. Id. at 926.
120. See id. at 928.
121. Id. at 929.
122. See id. (citing In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P., 235 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2007) (orig.
proceeding) (granting mandamus to require dismissal of claims over which public utility
commission had exclusive jurisdiction because “[a]llowing the trial court to proceed if the
PUC has exclusive jurisdiction would disrupt the orderly processes of government”) and In
re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (same)). The supreme
court did not specifically mention adequacy of an appellate remedy. Cf. In re Dickason, 987
S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (where trial court lacked juris-
diction and order was therefore void, party did not have adequate remedy by appeal and
was entitled to mandamus relief).
123. 442 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
124. Id. at 257.
125. Id. at 258.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 11.
128. In re Vaishangi, 442 S.W.3d at 258.
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loan-modification agreement in the trial court.129 Several days later, “the
trial court signed an agreed order dismissing all claims.”130 The signed
order, however, failed to incorporate the entire Rule 11 agreement.”131
After further disagreements about the terms of the settlement and the
remaining principal, the Bank foreclosed on the hotel property and
Vaishangi filed suit in Bexar County for wrongful foreclosure. In re-
sponse, the Bank filed a “Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement”—
the agreement that arose in the Harris County lawsuit described above
that had been dismissed eleven months prior.132 Vaishangi argued (1)
“the trial court had no jurisdiction to enforce the Rule 11 agreement be-
cause the trial court’s plenary power to do so expired thirty days after
signing the dismissal order”; and (2) a “genuine issue of material fact ex-
isted regarding the balance owed under the modification agreement that
should be resolved by trial.”133 The trial court “issued an order granting
the Bank’s motion to enforce the Rule 11 agreement [and] ordering
Vaishangi to execute the modification agreement.”134 Vaishangi unsuc-
cessfully sought mandamus relief in the court of appeals, then filed a peti-
tion for writ of mandamus in the supreme court. Specifically, Vaishangi
sought to “set aside the trial court’s enforcement order by contending
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction” as to that order.135
Summarizing the issues, the supreme court made two observations: (1)
“[i]f the Rule 11 agreement is a final judgment, as the Bank argues, the
trial court maintains continuing jurisdiction to enforce that judgment”;
and (2) “[i]f, however, the agreement is simply an interlocutory order,
and the dismissal order signed four days later is the court’s final judg-
ment, as Vaishangi argues, the trial court was without jurisdiction to en-
force the Rule 11 agreement because its plenary power had expired.”136
Additionally, the supreme court noted:
When parties dictate a settlement agreement on the record (creating
an enforceable agreement under Rule 11) and the trial court ap-
proves it on the record, such a settlement agreement does not consti-
tute an agreed judgment unless “[t]he words used by the trial court





132. Id. (“Because Vaishangi had not yet executed the loan-modification agreement,
the motion to enforce requested that the court order Vaishangi to pay damages, costs, and
attorney’s fees. Alternatively, the Bank requested that the court order Vaishangi to exe-
cute the loan modification agreement.”).
133. Id. at 258–59.
134. Id. at 259.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d) (providing trial court’s plenary power runs for
thirty days after judgment is signed)).
137. Id. (citing S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1995) (per
curiam)).
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Based on the record, the supreme court concluded that “[t]he only rea-
sonable conclusion is that the dismissal order is the trial court’s final judg-
ment and the Rule 11 agreement is not.”138 According to the supreme
court, (1) “[w]hen, as here, the trial court’s plenary power had expired, a
party could not ‘reinvest the trial court that dismissed the case with juris-
diction to enforce the settlement agreement’ by filing a post-judgment
motion to enforce the agreement”;139 (2) “[w]hen the trial court never-
theless heard the motion and issued an order enforcing the settlement
agreement, the trial court exceeded its jurisdictional authority”;140 and
(3) “[i]n these instances, mandamus is proper even without a showing
that the relator lacks an adequate remedy on appeal.”141
6. Standing
In re Fisher142 presented several mandamus issues, including whether
an aggrieved party has standing to assert claims after the sale of a com-
pany and whether the trial court has jurisdiction over that party’s claims
against certain parties. In May 2007, Mike Richey sold his Richey Oilfield
Construction, Inc. (Richey Oil) interest to Nighthawk Oilfield Services,
Ltd. (Nighthawk). Mark Fisher and Reece Boudreaux (relators or de-
fendants) were limited partners of Nighthawk.143 Under the terms of the
transaction, (1) Richey Oil became Nighthawk’s wholly-owned subsidi-
ary; and (2) Richey “remain[ed] employed as president of Richey Oil and
[became] a limited partner in Nighthawk.”144 In 2009, Nighthawk and
Richey Oil filed for bankruptcy.
Richey sued defendants, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
common law fraud, statutory fraud, violations of the Texas Securities Act,
defamation, negligent misrepresentation, and interference with prospec-
tive business relations. In response, defendants argued that Richey’s
claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
(1) Richey no longer had standing to claims related to his reputation or
goodwill, because those rights had been conveyed to Nighthawk; and (2)
several of Richey’s “other claims belonged to Nighthawk and could only
138. Id. at 260.
139. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 663 (Tex. 2009)). The su-
preme court noted that “[w]hile a party can certainly pursue a claim for breach of a settle-
ment agreement even when that settlement agreement is not an agreed judgment, ‘[t]he
party seeking enforcement of the settlement agreement must pursue a separate claim for
breach of contract.’” Id.
140. Id. at 261.
141. Id. (citing In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding) (“Mandamus is proper if a trial court issues an order beyond its jurisdic-
tion.”)); see also In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam) (orig. pro-
ceeding) (where trial court lacked jurisdiction, party was without adequate remedy by
appeal).
142. 433 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (opinion authored by Justice
Johnson).
143. Id. at 525.
144. Id.
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be brought by the bankruptcy trustee.”145 Additionally, defendants
moved to transfer venue or dismiss the lawsuit under the mandatory
venue selection clauses in the documents signed by the parties at the time
of the sale of Richey Oil. The trial court, however, denied defendants’
pleas to the jurisdiction and their motion respecting venue.146 Defendants
unsuccessfully sought mandamus relief in the court of appeals, then filed
a petition for mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme Court.147
As to standing, Richey argued in the supreme court that (1) the de-
fendants were not entitled to mandamus review on that issue because
defendants could not show they lack an adequate remedy by appeal; and
(2) even if defendants were granted mandamus review, Richey had stand-
ing because of the personal damages unique to him.148 The supreme court
observed: (1) Texas law provides that “a partner who is ‘personally ag-
grieved’ may bring claims for those injuries he suffered directly”; and (2)
“Richey’s allegations do not affirmatively negate his having been ‘person-
ally aggrieved.’”149 Therefore, the supreme court concluded it “need not
decide whether mandamus review [was] available to [defendants] as to
Richey’s standing to assert his claims” in question because even if it was,
the record did not demonstrate defendants were entitled to mandamus
relief.150
As to defendants’ argument that Richey must file some of his claims
against Nighthawk in bankruptcy court, the supreme court stated: (1)
“[w]hether those claims should have been brought against another party
(Nighthawk) is not a question of jurisdiction requiring dismissal, but is a
question of liability”; and (2) “[defendants] did not argue in the trial
court that they were the incorrect parties for Richey to bring the claims
against.”151 The supreme court concluded that the defendants “have not
shown themselves entitled to mandamus relief on this ground.”152
7. Texas Citizens’ Participation Act
In In re Lipsky,153 the Texas Supreme Court settled a disagreement
among the courts of appeals respecting the Texas Citizens Participation
Act (TCPA)154 by announcing that “clear and specific evidence under the
Act includes relevant circumstantial evidence.”155 Property owners
145. Id. at 527.
146. See id.
147. See infra notes 355–59 and accompanying text (explaining disposition of defen-
dant’s request for mandamus relief with respect to venue).
148. In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d at 527.
149. Id. at 527–28.
150. Id. at 528.
151. Id.
152. Id. In light of its conclusions, the supreme court did not address the adequacy of an
appellate remedy.
153. 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (opinion authored by Justice
Devine).
154. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011 (West 2015) (titled “Ac-
tions Involving the Exercise of Certain Constitutional Rights”).
155. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 584.
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Steven and Shyla Lipsky contacted Alisa Rich, an environmental consult-
ant, to obtain an analysis of water in a well on the Lipskys’ property that
the Lipskys suspected had been contaminated. Through tests, Rich con-
firmed that methane and other gases were present in the well. Steven
Lipsky complained to the Texas Railroad Commission, alleging Range
Resources Corporation and Range Production Company (Range), which
operated two gas wells about a half-mile from the Lipskys’ property, were
partially responsible for contaminating his groundwater. The railroad
commission investigated Steven’s complaints, but concluded: “Range’s
operations in the area were not the source of the contamination.”156
Steven, however, “denounced the railroad commission’s decision in the
media and continued to blame Range,” using allegations he made in his
complaints.157
Subsequently, the Lipskys filed a lawsuit against Range, alleging that
by conducting fracking operations near their property (1) Range was neg-
ligent, grossly negligent, and causing a nuisance; and (2) Range was con-
taminating their water well. Range “filed a counterclaim against the
Lipskys and a third-party claim against Rich,” alleging defamation, busi-
ness disparagement, civil conspiracy, and various aiding and abetting
claims.158 The Lipskys and Rich contended that Range’s claims consti-
tuted “an improper attempt to suppress their First Amendment rights”
and moved to dismiss those claims pursuant to the TCPA.159 The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss Range’s claims under the TCPA.160
The Lipskys and Rich sought mandamus relief in the court of appeals161
and that relief was granted in part.162 Both Range and Steven then filed
petitions for mandamus relief in the supreme court.
Addressing the evidentiary standard, the supreme court noted that the
expedited dismissal available under the TCPA places a burden on the
plaintiff to establish by “clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for
each essential element of the claim in question.”163 Further, the supreme
court observed that the parties’ dispute required resolution of an issue on
which the courts of appeals also were in disagreement: whether that bur-
den requires a plaintiff to produce direct evidence supporting each ele-
ment of its claim, or whether that burden allows consideration of





161. See id. At the time the Lipskys and Rich sought mandamus relief in this case, “the
courts of appeals disagreed as to whether the TCPA granted an interlocutory appeal from
an order denying dismissal. The Legislature has since clarified that an interlocutory appeal
is permitted from an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss under the TCPA.” Id.
at 585 n.2 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(12)).
162. Id. at 586. Specifically, the court of appeals concluded the TCPA required dismis-
sal of (1) all of Range’s claims against Shyla Lipsky and Rich; and (2) the civil conspiracy
and aiding and abetting claims against all defendants, including Steven. Id.
163. Id. at 587 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(c)).
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circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences.164 The supreme court
concluded that “[t]hough the TCPA initially demands more information
about the underlying claim, the Act does not impose an elevated eviden-
tiary standard or categorically reject circumstantial evidence.”165
Having established the evidentiary standard, the supreme court ad-
dressed Steven’s argument that “no clear and specific evidence showed
he defamed Range or disparaged its business.”166 As to business dispar-
agement, the supreme court stated that the evidence relied upon by
Range consisted of an affidavit that was conclusory and therefore did not
satisfy the TCPA standard.167 As to defamation, the supreme court stated
that viewing the entirety of Steven’s publications in question, (1) “the gist
of his statements were that Range was responsible for contaminating his
well water and the Railroad Commission was unduly influenced to rule
otherwise”; and (2) “[h]is statements were not presented as opinion but
were ‘sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or
false.’”168 The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals’ conclu-
sion that “there was some evidence of a defamatory statement concerning
Range sufficient to defeat [the Lipskys’] TCPA motion to dismiss.”169
Finally, the supreme court agreed with the court of appeals “that no
clear and specific evidence establishe[d] a prima facie case that Shyla Lip-
sky or Alisa Rich published any defamatory remarks concerning Range
or conspired with Steven Lipsky ‘to publicly blame Range for the con-
tamination.’”170 Based on its conclusions, the supreme court denied the
respective petitions for mandamus relief filed by Steven and Range.171
8. Intervention After Final Judgment
State v. Naylor172 arose from the State of Texas’s “attempt to intervene
in a civil lawsuit after the trial court had rendered final judgment.”173 In
2004, Texas residents Angelique Naylor and Sabina Daly married in Mas-
sachusetts. Subsequently, “Naylor filed for divorce in Travis County,
Texas.”174 Despite recognizing the district court’s jurisdiction over the
controversy, Daly contested the divorce, arguing that Texas courts lack
jurisdiction “to implicitly recognize same-sex marriage by issuing divorce
decrees to same-sex couples.”175 Following a hearing, “the trial court
orally granted an ostensible divorce ‘pursuant to the agreement [the par-
164. See id.
165. Id. at 591.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 593.
168. Id. at 594–95.
169. Id. at 595.
170. Id. at 597.
171. Id.
172. 466 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (Justice Brown authored the opinion
of the court, Justice Boyd rendered the concurring opinion, and Justices Willett and Devine
rendered dissenting opinions).
173. Id. at 786.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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ties had] recited into the record,’” which stipulated “that the judgment ‘is
intended to be a substitute for . . . a valid and subsisting divorce,’ and ‘is
intended to dispose of all economic issues and liabilities as between the
parties whether they [are] divorced or not.’”176
The following day, the State (1) petitioned to intervene in the trial
court, seeking “to oppose the Original Petition for Divorce and to defend
the constitutionality of Texas and federal laws that limit divorce actions to
persons of the opposite sex who are married to one another”; and (2)
“raised a plea to the jurisdiction urging the trial court to dismiss Naylor’s
petition.”177 The trial court, however, declined to entertain the State’s
petition in intervention because of the belatedness of the intervention.
But the trial court encouraged the State to appeal. “[T]he court of ap-
peals . . . dismissed the State’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding the
intervention untimely and finding no basis for appellate standing.”178 The
State requested the Texas Supreme Court’s review concerning two mat-
ters: (1) “to allow the [State’s] intervention and to vacate the divorce”;
and, alternatively, (2) to issue “a writ of mandamus ordering the [trial]
court to vacate its decree and dismiss the petition for want of
jurisdiction.”179
Despite the State’s request, the supreme court agreed with the court of
appeals’ conclusion that there was no basis for the State’s appellate stand-
ing.180 Further, the supreme court stated that even if jurisdiction were
established, “we would find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s de-
cision not to consider the untimely petition.”181 Specifically, the supreme
court reasoned (1) “[t]he record reveal[ed] that the State . . . had ade-
quate opportunity to timely intervene and simply failed to diligently as-
sert its rights”; (2) under Texas law, “a plea in intervention comes too late
if filed after judgment and may not be considered unless and until the
judgment has been set aside”; and (3) upon filing its petition in interven-
tion, “the State did not ask the court to set aside or otherwise revisit the
disputed divorce decree.”182
Additionally, as to the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, the su-
preme court observed that pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 52.3(e), “[i]f [a] petition is filed in the Supreme Court without first
being presented to the court of appeals, the petition must state the com-
pelling reason why the petition was not first presented to the court of
appeals.”183 The supreme court noted that the State argued (1) “it did not
file a mandamus petition in the court of appeals because it thought it
would have standing to appeal”; and (2) “it did not submit its mandamus




180. Id. at 792.
181. Id.
182. Id. (emphasis removed).
183. Id. at 793 (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(e)).
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arguments to the court of appeals because the effort would have been
futile.”184 The supreme court, however, reasoned that (1) “[a] litigant’s
mistaken understanding of law is not a compelling reason for this Court
to consider an unreviewed mandamus argument”; and (2) “a party may
not circumvent the court of appeals simply by arguing futility.”185 Conse-
quently, the supreme court denied the State’s petition for writ of manda-
mus and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.186
C. DISCOVERY
In re Doe187 involved an issue of first impression respecting personal
jurisdiction regarding a request for pre-suit discovery under Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 202.188 An anonymous blogger who called himself “the
Trooper” launched online posts that disparaged the operations and char-
acter of an Ohio company, with offices in Texas and elsewhere, and its
chairman and chief executive officer (collectively, Reynolds). To deter-
mines the blogger’s identity, Reynolds sought to depose Google, Inc., the
host of the blog, by filing a Rule 202 petition in Harris County district
court. According to the petition, Reynolds (1) ‘“anticipate[s] the institu-
tion of a suit’ against the Trooper”; and (2) “will sue for libel and business
disparagement, and, if the Trooper is a Reynolds employee, for breach of
fiduciary duty.”189 Reynolds sent the petition to the Trooper’s email ad-
dress and fulfilled the Rule 202 notice requirement.
Remaining anonymous and appearing through his counsel as “John
Doe,” the Trooper opposed Reynolds’ petition.190 He filed a special ap-
pearance in which he (1) “assert[ed] that his only contact with Texas is
that his blog can be read on the Internet here”; (2) “argu[ed] that because
he does not have minimal contacts with Texas sufficient for a Texas court
to exercise personal jurisdiction over him, there is no proper court under
Rule 202 to order a deposition to investigate a suit in which he may be a
defendant”; and (3) “moved to quash the discovery on the ground that he
has a First Amendment right to speak anonymously.”191 The trial court
disagreed and ordered Google, Inc.’s deposition to “prevent a failure or
delay of justice in an anticipated suit.”192 Likewise, the court of appeals
denied mandamus relief, so the Trooper sought mandamus relief in the
Texas Supreme Court.
184. Id. at 793–94.
185. Id. (citing In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d 729, 730 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding)). The supreme court did not address the adequacy of an appel-
late remedy.
186. Id. at 786.
187. 444 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (Justice Hecht authored the opinion,
and Justice Lehrmann rendered a dissenting opinion).
188. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1–.2 (allowing “a proper court” to authorize a deposition
to investigate a potential claim before suit is filed).
189. In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d at 605.
190. Id. (Google, Inc. did not oppose Reynolds’ petition).
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.4(a)(1)).
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The supreme court concluded that a proper court pursuant to Rule 202
“must have personal jurisdiction over the potential defendant.”193 Specif-
ically, the court reasoned (1) “[u]nder Rule 120a, a defendant who files a
special appearance in a suit is entitled to have the issue of personal juris-
diction heard and decided before any other matter”; and (2) by granting
the discovery order, the trial court adjudicated the Trooper’s claimed
First Amendment right to anonymity and thus forced the Trooper “to
litigate the merits of an important issue before a court that has not been
shown to have personal jurisdiction over him.”194 Additionally, the su-
preme court stated that “[t]o allow a Rule 202 court to order discovery
without personal jurisdiction over a potential defendant unreasonably ex-
pands the rule” and, contrary to the intent of Rule 202, would allow “any-
one in the world to investigate anyone else in the world against whom suit
could be brought within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”195 Ac-
cording to the supreme court, “[t]he burden is on the plaintiff in an action
to plead allegations showing personal jurisdiction over the defendant,”
and “[t]he same burden should be on a potential plaintiff under Rule
202.”196 Thus, the supreme court concluded that the trial court exceeded
its Rule 202 authority by allowing the requested pre-suit discovery and
conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus.197
In re National Lloyds Insurance Co.198 arose from a discovery request
alleged to be overbroad. An insured, Mary Erving, filed claims with her
homeowner’s insurance carrier (National Lloyds) for the storm damage
to her Cedar Hill home in Dallas County, Texas.199 After sending adjust-
ers to inspect Erving’s home, National Lloyds paid the claims. Subse-
quently, Erving filed a lawsuit against National Lloyds, alleging that the
insurer had undervalued her claims.200 In preparation for trial, Erving
made the following discovery requests: (1) “all claim files from the previ-
ous six years involving three specific adjusters”; and (2) “all claim files
from the past year for properties in Dallas and Tarrant counties involving
. . . the two adjusting firms that handled Erving’s claims.”201 Arguing that
the request was overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeking irrelevant
evidence, National Lloyds objected. Despite National Lloyds’s objection,
193. Id. at 608.
194. Id. at 608–09 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a).
195. Id. at 610.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 611. The element of adequate remedy by appeal was not specifically ad-
dressed. But cf. In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 419–20 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (party
to Rule 202 proceeding had no adequate remedy on appeal where trial court abused discre-
tion in ordering discovery); In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam)
(orig. proceeding) (where trial court lacked jurisdiction, party was without adequate rem-
edy by appeal).
198. 449 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
199. Id. at 487.
200. Id. at 487–88. Specifically, Erving alleged “breach of contract, breach of duty of
good faith and fair dealing, fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and violations of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act and . . . the Texas Insurance Code.” Id.
201. Id.
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the trial court issued an order compelling the two adjusting firms to pro-
duce the files for claims they handled. But the trial court “limited the
order to claims related to properties in Cedar Hill and to the storms that
caused the damage to Erving’s home.”202 After the court of appeals de-
nied mandamus relief, National Lloyds filed a petition for writ of manda-
mus in the Texas Supreme Court.
The supreme court observed that “[a] discovery order that compels
production beyond the rules of procedure is an abuse of discretion for
which mandamus is the proper remedy.”203 Additionally, the supreme
court noted that the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3(a) allows for
discovery of “any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the sub-
ject matter of the pending action” and provides, “[i]t is no ground for
objection ‘that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.’”204 The supreme court, however, cautioned,
“even these liberal bounds have limits, and discovery requests must not
be overbroad.”205
According to the supreme court, Erving essentially “proposed to com-
pare National Lloyds’ evaluation of the damage to her home with Na-
tional Lloyds’ evaluation of the damage to other homes to support her
contention that her claims were undervalued.”206 But the supreme court
stated, given the many variables associated with any particular claim, “we
fail to see how National Lloyds’ overpayment, underpayment, or proper
payment of the claims of unrelated third parties is probative of its con-
duct with respect to Erving’s undervaluation claims at issue in this
case.”207 The supreme court concluded that “[b]ecause the information
Erving seeks is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence, the trial court’s order compelling discovery of such in-
formation is necessarily overbroad.”208 Accordingly, the supreme court
conditionally granted mandamus relief.209
In re Ford Motor Co.210 involved discovery into the potential bias of an
expert witness in a products liability, design defect case. The plaintiff,
202. Id.
203. Id. (citing In re Deere & Co., 299 S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding); Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding)). The supreme court did not specifically address the element of adequacy of an
appellate remedy. But see In re Deere, 299 S.W.3d at 820 (concluding overly broad discov-
ery order satisfied mandamus requirement of “clear abuse of discretion for which there is
no adequate remedy by appeal”).
204. In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 449 S.W.3d at 488 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 489.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 490 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(c)). In a footnote, the supreme court stated
that its conclusions were based “on this plaintiff’s allegations” and added, “[w]e do not
hold that evidence of third-party insurance claims can never be relevant in coverage litiga-
tion.” Id. at 489 n.2.
209. Id. at 490.
210. 427 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
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Saul Morales, was apprehended by a police officer while fleeing from po-
lice on foot. As the officer attempted to handcuff Morales, the officer’s
parked, unoccupied vehicle rolled backward, struck, and injured Morales.
Morales sued the manufacturer and seller of the police car (collectively
Ford), alleging “the vehicle had a design defect that . . . caused the vehicle
to go into an idle-powered reverse.”211 To support its defense, Ford re-
tained two expert witnesses employed by Exponent, Inc. and Carr Engi-
neering, Inc., respectively. After deposing both expert witnesses,
“Morales sought corporate-representative depositions from Exponent
and Carr Engineering on seventeen topics, arguing that the additional
depositions were necessary to prove each testifying expert’s bias in favor
of Ford and other automobile manufacturers.”212 The trial court ordered
that the requested discovery be allowed. Ford then filed a petition for
writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court.
Initially, the supreme court introduced two pertinent discovery rules:
(1) Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3(e) that “sets forth the scope of
information that parties may discover about a testifying expert, which in-
cludes ‘any bias of the witness’”;213 and (2) Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
195 that “addresses the methods for obtaining such information, limiting
testifying-expert discovery to that acquired through disclosures, expert
reports, and oral depositions of expert witnesses.”214 Additionally, the
supreme court stated (1) “[t]he official comments to Rule 195 articulate a
goal of minimizing ‘undue expense’ in conducting expert discovery”;215
(2) that goal “comports with efforts by this Court and others to curb dis-
covery abuse through the implementation of carefully crafted principles
and procedures”;216 and (3) “[c]ourts have recognized that discovery into
the extent of an expert’s bias is not without limits.”217 According to the
supreme court, the particular deposition notices in this case, which sought
“sensitive information covering twelve years,” constituted “just the type
of overbroad discovery the rules are intended to prevent.”218 Further, the
supreme court stated (1) “neither expert’s credibility has been im-
pugned”; and (2) “Morales has not demonstrated any other circumstance
to warrant deposing the witnesses’ employers’ corporate representa-
tives.”219 Therefore, the supreme court conditionally granted Ford’s peti-
tion for writ of mandamus.220
211. Id. at 397.
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(e)).
214. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 195)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing In re Weir, 166 S.W.3d 861, 865 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, orig. pro-
ceeding) (per curiam) (concluding mandamus was proper where trial court abused discre-
tion by ordering expert to testify as to personal financial information and stating, “Because
the information sought to be protected would be disclosed before any appeal would be
available, relators lack an adequate legal remedy”)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 398.
220. Id.
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In the case of In re Memorial Hermann Hospital System,221 the Texas
Supreme Court addressed whether medical privileges protected certain
documents from disclosure. A heart surgeon (Gomez) filed a lawsuit
against a hospital system, a physician network, and several individual
physicians (collectively, defendants), contending defendants retaliated
against him and spread false impressions of his practice because he joined
a competing hospital. Gomez’s claims included, “business disparagement,
defamation, tortious interference with prospective business relations, and
improper restraint of trade under the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust
Act” (TFEAA).222 In response to Gomez’s motion to compel production
of certain documents, defendants asserted two privileges, the medical
committee privilege and the medical peer review committee privilege, to
protect the documents from discovery. After an in camera inspection, and
the trial court’s order to produce the specified documents, defendants un-
successfully sought mandamus relief in the court of appeals, then filed a
petition for writ of mandamus in the supreme court.
The supreme court observed, “Mandamus is proper when the trial
court erroneously orders the disclosure of privileged information because
the trial court’s error cannot be corrected on appeal.”223 Then, the su-
preme court reasoned: (1) while records of and communications to a
medical peer review committee are generally privileged and not discover-
able, § 160.007(b) of the Texas Occupations Code224 “provides a limited
exception to confidentiality for proceedings, records, or communications
that are relevant to an anticompetitive action”;225 (2) “Gomez’s petition
presents multiple viable anticompetitive actions”;226 (3) several specified
documents examined by the trial court in camera “lack any apparent rele-
vance to [Gomez’s] claims” and therefore, the trial court “abused its dis-
cretion in compelling” defendants to produce those particular
documents;227 (4) “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making a
preliminary finding” that the remaining documents in question are “rele-
vant to the anticompetitive actions” pleaded by Gomez;228 and (5) those
documents did not “enjoy any residual protection under the medical com-
mittee privilege.”229 The supreme court conditionally granted defendants’
petition for writ of mandamus in part, “directing the trial court to modify
its discovery order insofar as the order compelled production of [the]
documents” specified by the supreme court as not relevant to Gomez’s
221. 464 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (opinion authored by Justice
Willett).
222. Id. at 696–97; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01–.52 (West 2015).
223. In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d at 697–98 (citing In re E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 222 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
224. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007(b) (2015).
225. In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d at 700.
226. Id. at 713.
227. Id. at 715–16.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 716–17.
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claims, but otherwise denied the petition for writ of mandamus.230
In re Longview Energy Co.231 presented novel issues respecting super-
sedeas and discovery in a lawsuit filed by an oil and gas company (Long-
view) alleging breach of fiduciary duty against five defendants. The
defendants consisted of (1) a minority shareholder of Longview’s stock
(Huff Energy); (2) Huff Energy’s general partner (WRH); (3) an entity
formed by Huff Energy to compete with Longview (Riley-Huff); and (4)
two of Huff Energy’s principals, William R. Huff and Rick D’Angelo.
Longview (1) alleged breach of fiduciary duty in Riley-Huff’s asset acqui-
sition of a shale formation, the Eagle Ford shale, that was also being pur-
sued by Longview; and (2) specifically “sought disgorgement of the
defendants’ unjust enrichment.”232
The jury found (1) Huff and D’Angelo, two of Huff Energy’s princi-
pals, breached their fiduciary duty to Longview; (2) “Huff Energy and
Riley-Huff knowingly participated”; (3) “as a result, Riley-Huff ‘wrong-
fully obtain[ed] assets in the Eagle Ford shale’”; and (4) “Riley-Huff had
paid $24.5 million for assets with a market value of $42 million, had spent
$127 million to develop them, and had received $120 million in past pro-
duction revenue.”233 “The trial court awarded Longview a constructive
trust over almost all Riley-Huff’s Eagle Ford shale assets and future pro-
duction revenues . . . and ordered Riley-Huff to convey them to Long-
view.”234 Additionally, Longview was awarded, “against all five
defendants jointly and severally, the same future net production revenues
covered by the constructive trust ‘and an additional $95,500,000.00.’”235
The defendants appealed the awards and “together posted a $25 mil-
lion bond as security to supersede enforcement of the judgment.”236 In
response, “Longview moved in the trial court to require each of the five
defendants to post security equal to the lesser of $25 million or 50% of
the defendants’ net worth.”237 The trial court (1) “granted the motion
except as to Riley-Huff”; (2) signed an order increasing the “security re-
quired for the other four defendants” (the security order); and (3) “or-
dered Huff Energy to produce on a monthly basis essentially all
documents pertaining to the operation of the Eagle Ford shale assets held
by Riley-Huff” (the discovery order).238
230. Id. at 719.
231. 464 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (opinion authored by Chief Justice
Hecht).
232. Id. at 355–56.
233. Id. at 356.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(b) (West 2015) (provid-
ing, “Notwithstanding any other law or rule of court, when a judgment is for money, the
amount of security must not exceed the lesser of: (1) 50 percent of the judgment debtor’s
net worth; or (2) $25 million”)).
237. Id. at 356.
238. Id.
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The defendants sought relief from both orders described above by mo-
tion in the court of appeals. The court of appeals concluded “the defend-
ants were together required to post only $25 million in security to
supersede the judgment as to them all,” but denied reversal of the discov-
ery order.239 Both Longview and the defendants petitioned the Texas Su-
preme Court for relief by mandamus.240
As to the discovery order, the supreme court observed that after the
trial court rendered judgment in Longview’s favor, (1) Longview moved
for post-judgment discovery of the defendants’ operation of the disputed
assets under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.1(e), which provides,
“[t]he trial court may make any order necessary to adequately protect the
judgment creditor against loss or damage that the appeal might cause”;241
and (2) the trial court granted the motion, and ordered defendants to
produce essentially all information related to the assets covered by the
judicially created constructive trust.242 Then, the supreme court consid-
ered the defendants’ arguments that the trial court’s discovery order was
an abuse of discretion, because (1) “Rule 24.1(e) should not permit dis-
covery that’s not allowed” under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 621a that
governs post-judgment discovery; (2) “the trial court had no evidence of
any threat of dissipation of assets”; and (3) the discovery order “under-
mines the right to an effective appeal by requiring the ongoing produc-
tion of documents [and thereby] ‘giv[ing] Longview free rein to continue
seeking discovery as a means of coercing . . . settlement.’”243
In rejecting the defendants’ first argument, the supreme court reasoned
that “nothing in Rule 621a purports to limit Rule 24.1(e); to the contrary,
Rule 621a permits discovery relevant to Rule 24 motions.”244
As to the defendant’s second argument, the supreme court observed
that the purpose of the trial court’s discovery order was to provide Long-
view “discovery in lieu of security” as to the “constructive trust portion of
its judgment” to avoid substantial hardship on the continued operation of
the disputed assets. The supreme court concluded that “Longview was
entitled to security to supersede the judgment without showing any
[threat of dissipation of assets].”245
Finally, as to defendants’ third argument, the supreme court stated that
“[t]he trial court and the court of appeals both considered [the defend-
ants’] argument and concluded that the discovery order was reasonable,”
and commented: “We are unable to find a reason to contradict them.”246
The supreme court concluded that the trial court did not abuse discretion
239. Id. at 356–57.
240. Id. at 357. As to disposition of the parties’ arguments about the security order, see
infra notes 346–354 and accompanying text.
241. Id. at 361 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(e)).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 362 (quoting Cross-Relators Br. on the Merits, at 11–12, In re Longview
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through its discovery order and, accordingly, denied mandamus relief.247
D. REGULATION OF PRACTICE OF LAW
In re The State Bar of Texas248 involved the availability of expunged
criminal court records for use in a pending disciplinary action against the
lead prosecutor in the criminal case to which the records pertained. In
November 2011, the Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline (the Com-
mission) received a news article about Joshua Bledsoe’s aggravated rob-
bery trial. According to the article, Bledsoe was acquitted because Jon L.
Hall, the lead prosecutor in that case, suppressed exculpatory evidence.
Subsequently, the Commission commenced a disciplinary action against
Hall. Rather than appearing before a district court, Hall elected a griev-
ance panel to hear his disciplinary action proceeding. In answer to an
evidentiary petition filed by the Commission, “Hall complained that he
did not have access to records necessary to his defense because all
records from the aggravated robbery case had been expunged.”249 The
Commission, with Bledsoe’s consent, “filed a motion in the trial court
that had presided over the criminal prosecution . . . [requesting] access to
the expunged records for use in the pending disciplinary action.”250 After
a hearing, a visiting judge in the trial court found that the underlying
expunction order barred the Commission’s reliance on any of the ex-
punged records.251 The grievance panel construed the trial court’s actions
as a bar to the disciplinary proceeding and granted Hall’s motion for sum-
mary judgment.252
The Commission appealed the grievance panel’s summary judgment to
the Board of Disciplinary Appeals and sought review of the trial court’s
order in the court of appeals. Additionally, the Commission filed a peti-
tion for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court. The Commission
argued in the supreme court that (1) the trial court’s “application of the
expunction statute was a clear abuse of discretion because it ignore[d] the
acquitted defendant’s wishes, contravene[d] the statute’s primary pur-
pose, and interfere[d] with the Commission’s ability to prosecute the dis-
ciplinary action before the grievance panel”;253 and (2) mandamus relief
in that court was appropriate “because the court of appeals cannot re-
dress the ultimate consequence of the trial court’s order—the dismissal of
the Commission’s disciplinary action.”254
247. Id. In light of its conclusion described above respecting abuse of discretion, the
supreme court did not reach the element of adequacy of an appellate remedy.
248. 440 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (Justice Devine authored the opin-
ion, and Justice Boyd rendered a concurring opinion).
249. Id. at 623.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 622.
253. Id. at 625.
254. Id. at 623–24; see also In re State Bar of Tex., 113 S.W.3d 730, 732 (Tex. 2003) (orig.
proceeding) (concluding mandamus was appropriate remedy to correct district court’s in-
terference in regulation of legal practice).
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The supreme court observed that pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure article 55.01(a), “[a] person wrongfully arrested for a crime is
‘entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest’ expunged, if
certain conditions[, such as acquittal,] are met.”255 The supreme court,
however, pointed out, “Expunction . . . is not absolute.”256 The supreme
court noted that the code of criminal procedure provides two exceptions
for acquittal cases, which apply under the following conditions:
(1) the records and files are necessary [to investigate and prosecute]
a person other than the person who is the subject of the expunction
order; or (2) the state establishes that the records and files are neces-
sary for use in (A) another criminal case . . . or (B) a civil case,
including a civil suit or suit for possession of or access to a child.257
The supreme court concluded, “Given the waiver expressed by the ac-
quitted defendant, the relevance of the expunged records to the discipli-
nary proceeding, and the Commission’s expressed need for those records,
the trial court abused its discretion by extending the expungement order
to the Commission and thereby interfering in the disciplinary proceed-
ing.”258 Further, the supreme court stated, “An order that directly inter-
feres with the Commission’s ability to collect and present evidence is as
much a direct interference in the disciplinary process as an order directed
to a grievance panel itself.”259 The supreme court concluded, “Because
the court’s order interferes with the disciplinary process, disrupting the
regulatory scheme promulgated by this Court to govern cases of attorney
discipline, we conditionally grant relief and direct the trial court to vacate
its order.”260
In In re Dow,261 the Texas Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether its authority to regulate the practice of law provided it with juris-
diction to interfere with a sanction imposed against an attorney by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Miguel Angel Paredes was convicted of
capital murder in 2001 and his execution was later set for October 28,
2014.262 On June 9, 2014, David Dow, an “experienced post-trial capital
defense attorney,” received a “letter from Paredes asking for last minute
help.”263 Dow responded and, from September 12 to October 14, “inves-
tigated whether Paredes’s trial counsel was ineffective in not presenting
mitigating evidence” during the punishment phase of trial and “whether
255. In re State Bar of Texas, 440 S.W.3d at 622 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 55.01(a) (West Supp. 2014–15)).
256. Id. at 624.
257. Id. at 624–25 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.02 (West Supp.
2014–15)).
258. Id. at 627.
259. Id. (citing State Bar of Tex. v. Jefferson, 942 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam)
(orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief against district court that enjoined discipli-
nary proceedings before a grievance panel); State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1972)
(orig. proceeding) (same)).
260. In re State Bar of Texas, 440 S.W.3d at 627.
261. 481 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
262. Id. at 220–21.
263. Id.
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[Paredes’s] habeas counsel was ineffective in allowing him to waive that
claim.”264 On the afternoon of October 21, 2014, Dow filed several mo-
tions in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, including a motion to stay
Paredes’s execution. That relief was denied on October 23, and Paredes
was executed as scheduled on October 28.
Subsequently, “the court of criminal appeals ordered Dow to appear
. . . and show cause why he should not be sanctioned for violating [the
Court of Criminal Appeals’s] Miscellaneous Rule 11-003,” which pro-
vides in part that “[a] motion for stay of execution . . . must be filed . . . at
least seven days before the date of the scheduled execution date (exclu-
sive of the scheduled execution date).”265 Following a hearing, the court
of criminal appeals held Dow in contempt and issued an order that “sus-
pended [him] from practicing before the Court of Criminal Appeals for
one year, without first obtaining leave to do so.”266 Dow filed a petition
for writ of mandamus in the supreme court, “[complaining] that he
should not have been sanctioned” and that his suspension, described
above, “effectively bar[red] him from practicing law” during the time the
suspension was in effect.267 Further, Dow argued that the supreme court
has jurisdiction “to prevent the Court of Criminal Appeals from exceed-
ing its authority and from interfering with the [supreme court’s] exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law.”268
The supreme court observed that “Article V, Section 3(a) of the Texas
Constitution authorizes this Court to issue the writ of mandamus in two
instances: ‘as may be necessary to enforce its jurisdiction’ and ‘in such
cases as may be specified’ by the Legislature.”269 The supreme court,
however, concluded it did not have jurisdiction under the Texas Constitu-
tion over Dow’s petition for mandamus relief, in part because § 22.002(a)
of the Texas Government Code denied it that authority.270 Additionally,
264. Id. at 221–22.
265. Id. at 220, 223 (citing Misc. Docket No. 11-003 (Tex. Crim. App. June 30, 2011),
reprinted in TEXAS RULES OF COURT 417–18 (West 2015), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/
208124/ miscruleexecution.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7QP-M6TW]).
266. Id. at 223.
267. Id. Additionally, Dow requested declaratory relief in the supreme court. Id. at 220.
268. Id. at 223–24.
269. Id. at 224 (citing TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a)).
270. Id. Specifically, as to mandamus necessary to enforce its jurisdiction, the supreme
court stated in part (1) “we have repeatedly construed this provision as authorizing the
Court to issue writs only when a lower court’s action threatens to impair our appellate
jurisdiction or nullify the effect of our judgments”; and (2) “Dow’s petition does not fall
into either category, and the Court of Criminal Appeals is not a ‘lower court.’” Id. As to
the second instance, the supreme court stated “the Legislature has not authorized this
Court to issue the writ of mandamus to the Court of Criminal Appeals,” but rather “has
specifically denied this Court that authority” pursuant to § 22.002(a) of the Texas Govern-
ment Code. Id.; see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a) (West Supp. 2015). Section
22.002(a) provides in part:
The supreme court or a justice of the supreme court may issue . . . all writs of
. . . mandamus . . . against a statutory county court judge, a statutory probate
court judge, a district judge, a court of appeals or a justice of the court of
appeals, or any officer of state government except the governor, the court of
criminal appeals, or a judge of the court of criminal appeals.
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the supreme court observed that “[t]he authority to regulate the practice
of law in Texas belongs exclusively to this Court” and “is ‘derived from
both statutory and inherent powers.’”271 The supreme court, however,
stated that its authority to regulate the practice of law “does not itself
provide jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus.”272 According to the
supreme court, “[w]hile it is true that we have ‘consistently granted man-
damus relief when a lower court interferes with the disciplinary process,’
our authority to do so is derived from [Texas Government Code] Section
22.022(a), the same provision that denies us authority to mandamus the
Court of Criminal Appeals.”273 Further, the supreme court reasoned in
part,
The Court of Criminal Appeals has not undertaken to determine
what lawyers may practice before it. Rather, it has imposed a sanc-
tion for the violation of a rule that provides for such a sanction. This
in no way threatens our authority to regulate the Texas bar. . . . We
need not decide here what action we might take should any court
infringe on our authority to regulate the bar. That situation is not
presented here.274
The supreme court concluded it lacked mandamus jurisdiction and dis-
missed Dow’s petition for mandamus relief.275
E. “AUTHORITY” TO ISSUE ORDER ON FAMILY CODE MATTER
In In re Office of the Attorney General of Texas,276 the Texas Supreme
Court addressed whether Texas Family Code § 105.006277 gives a trial
court authority to order the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) to
remove a family violence indicator from a parent’s file and OAG’s sys-
tem. OAG filed a lawsuit in the trial court seeking to establish paternity
against a father, Cornelius Jackson. “[T]he associate judge issued a tem-
porary order establishing the parent-child relationship” and “ordered
Jackson to pay [monthly] child support.”278 Additionally, “the associate
judge determined no basis existed to show a history of family violence
and ordered OAG to remove the family violence indicator from Jackson’s
file and OAG’s system.”279 “The trial court denied OAG’s request for de
novo review . . . and affirmed and adopted the associate judge’s tempo-
rary order.”280 After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain mandamus relief
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a).
271. In re Dow, 481 S.W.3d at 224.
272. Id. at 225.
273. Id.; see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a) (West Supp. 2015).
274. In re Dow, 481 S.W.3d at 225–26.
275. Id. at 226. Additionally, the supreme court concluded (1) the declaratory relief
requested by Dow “is available only to make mandamus effective”; and (2) “[b]ecause we
lack mandamus jurisdiction, we also lack jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief.” Id.
276. 456 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
277. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.006 (West Supp. 2015).
278. In re Office of the Attorney Gen. of Tex., 456 S.W.3d at 154.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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in the court of appeals respecting the removal of the family violence indi-
cator, OAG sought mandamus relief in the supreme court.
The supreme court observed that pursuant to § 105.006 of the Texas
Family Code, final orders in child support proceedings must include cer-
tain personal information of the parties, including home and work ad-
dresses and social security numbers.281 Under § 105.006(c), however, if a
court finds that requiring a party to provide that required information to
another party “is likely to cause the child or a conservator harassment,
abuse, serious harm, or injury, the court may” (1) order the information
not to be disclosed to another party; or (2) “render any other order the
court considers necessary.”282 According to the supreme court, the sole
issue before it was “whether the trial court erred when it ordered OAG to
remove the family violence indicator from Jackson’s files and OAG’s sys-
tem, presumably under the authority of the Family Code’s ‘any other or-
der’ phrase in section 105.006(c)(2).”283
The supreme court stated that because Texas is a participant in the fed-
eral child support enforcement program, federal law requires OAG to
collect, store, and maintain certain required information respecting each
child support case, including a “family violence indicator (domestic vio-
lence or child abuse).”284 Further, after construing several statutes relied
upon by the parties, including § 105.006(c)(2), the supreme court con-
cluded (1) “[t]he Legislature has chosen to give OAG discretion to desig-
nate a case with the family violence indicator, and has not chosen to allow
trial courts to intervene, except to weigh the designation in considering a
request for disclosure”; and (2) “the trial court lacked authority to order
OAG to remove the indicator from its files.”285 Accordingly, the supreme
court conditionally granted OAG’s petition for writ of mandamus and di-
rected the trial court to vacate its order.286
F. ARBITRATION
Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP v. Lopez addressed
whether parties could enforce an arbitration provision enshrined in an
attorney–client employment contract.287 The law firm (Royston, Rayzor)
handled a divorce matter for Francisco Lopez. The employment contract
between Lopez and Royston, Rayzor contained an arbitration provision
281. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.006(a)).
282. Id. at 156 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.006(c)).
283. Id. at 154.
284. Id. at 155.
285. Id. at 156–57.
286. Id. at 157. The supreme court did not mention or address lack of an adequate
remedy on appeal, nor did it make clear in the case how the trial court’s lack of authority
related to jurisdiction. Cf. In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam)
(orig. proceeding) (where trial court lacked jurisdiction, party was without adequate rem-
edy by appeal).
287. Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 497 (Tex.
2015) (orig. proceeding) (Justice Johnson authored the opinion, and Justice Guzman ren-
dered a concurring opinion).
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that specified that “the client and firm will arbitrate disputes that arise
between them, except for claims made by the firm for recovery of its fees
and expenses.”288 Subsequently, Lopez filed suit against Royston,
Rayzor, claiming he was induced to accept an inadequate settlement. The
law firm “moved to compel arbitration under both the Texas Arbitration
Act . . . and common law.”289 After the trial court denied that motion,
Royston, Rayzor filed an “interlocutory appeal challenging the denial
under the Arbitration Act and an original proceeding in the court of ap-
peals seeking mandamus relief under common law.”290 “The court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to order arbitration under the
Arbitration Act and denied mandamus relief.”291 Specifically, the court
of appeals concluded the arbitration provision “was so one-sided it was
substantively unconscionable and unenforceable.”292
In the Texas Supreme Court, Royston, Rayzor sought (1) relief from
the court of appeals’ denial of its interlocutory appeal; and (2) “manda-
mus relief directing the trial court to order arbitration.”293 The supreme
court concluded Lopez did not meet his burden to prove that the arbitra-
tion provision was substantively unconscionable.294 Further, in the inter-
est of judicial economy, the supreme court considered Lopez’s additional
arguments that the arbitration provision was (1) against public policy be-
cause it allegedly violated a Disciplinary Rule of the State Bar of Texas;
and (2) illusory because it bound Lopez to arbitrate his claims against
Royston, Rayzor, while “excluding the only possible claim the firm might
ever realistically make against him.”295 The supreme court, however, re-
jected both arguments,296 reversed the judgment of the court of appeals,
and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.297 Addi-
tionally, the supreme court stated that “[b]ecause we . . . resolve the ap-
288. Id.
289. Id. at 498 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.021 (West 2011); L.H.
Lacy Co. v. City of Lubbock, 559 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1977) (noting that arbitration in





294. Id. at 502. Specifically, the supreme court (1) declined to consider several argu-
ments asserted by Lopez in support of unconscionability because those arguments were
“based on provisions in the contract as opposed to provisions in the arbitration provision”;
and (2) stated in part that “although the provision was one-sided in the sense that it ex-
cepted any fee claims by Royston, Rayzor from its scope, excepting that one type of dis-
pute does not make the agreement so grossly one-sided so as to be unconscionable.” Id. at
501–02.
295. Id. at 503, 505.
296. Id. at 504–05. As to those arguments, respectively, the supreme court stated in part
(1) while “[i]t is true that public policy is not solely established through legislative enact-
ments and may be informed by the Disciplinary Rules,” “where the Legislature has ad-
dressed a matter, as it has addressed the enforceability of arbitration provisions, we are
constrained to defer to that expression of policy”; and (2) “the fact that the scope of an
arbitration provision binds parties to arbitrate only certain disagreements does not make it
illusory.” Id.
297. Id. at 506.
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peal by means of Royston, Rayzor’s interlocutory appeal under the
Arbitration Act, we do not address the firm’s petition for writ of
mandamus.”298
G. PERFORMANCE OF MINISTERIAL DUTY
In re Woodfill299 involved an effort by a group of citizens to compel
performance of a ministerial duty by the Houston City Council respecting
a controversial “equal rights ordinance” passed by the council. On July 3,
2014, a coalition of Houston residents (collectively, Woodfill) “filed a ref-
erendum petition requesting the City Council to [either] reconsider and
repeal [the ordinance] or put it to popular vote.”300 Approximately one
month later, the city secretary reported in writing to the city council as
follows: “I am able to certify that [the required number of signatures is
17,269]; and [t]he number of signatures verified on the petition submitted
on July 3, 2014 is 17,846.”301 The city secretary’s report, however, con-
cluded with a paragraph noting that the city attorney conducted his own
review of the petition filing and found that many of the signatures were
on pages of the petition that were invalid and “[t]herefore, according to
the City Attorney’s Office only 2,449 pages containing 15,249 signatures
can lawfully be considered toward the signatures required.”302
“On August 4, 2014, the City announced it would not reconsider the
ordinance.”303 Woodfill (1) immediately sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief in district court; and (2) filed an August 11, 2014, original man-
damus proceeding in the court of appeals.304 The court of appeals,
however, denied mandamus relief, concluding relators “had an adequate
remedy by appeal.”305 Woodfill then “filed a supplemental petition in the
district court, requesting a writ of mandamus” and, simultaneously,
sought mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme Court.306
The supreme court noted that under the city’s charter, there are three
general steps in a challenge to a city ordinance: (1) “the referendum peti-
tion must be ‘signed and verified in the [required] manner and form’ by
the required number of voters and be timely filed”; (2) “the City Secre-
tary must review the petition, certify the results of her review, and pre-
sent such petition and certificate to the City Council”; and (3) “after
298. Id. at 499 (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceed-
ing) (explaining that mandamus is a discretionary remedy that issues only to correct a clear
abuse of discretion where no other adequate remedy by law exists)).
299. 470 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 477.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 478.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. While the mandamus proceedings in the supreme court were pending, the district
court (1) rendered a final judgment that the “total number of valid signatures was . . . less
than the required amount”; and (2) “denied all relief requested by [Woodfill].” Id. Wood-
fill’s appeal of the trial court’s judgment was pending in the court of appeals at the time the
supreme court addressed Woodfill’s petition for mandamus relief. Id.
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receiving the petition and City Secretary’s certificate, the City Council
must either repeal the ordinance or submit it to popular vote.”307 The
supreme court concluded (1) “the [City’s] Charter gives the City Secre-
tary, not the City Council, the discretion to evaluate the petition”; and (2)
although “the City Secretary’s report mentions the City Attorney’s find-
ings . . . the City Secretary certified [the] petition and thereby invoked the
City Council’s ministerial duty to reconsider and repeal the ordinance or
submit it to popular vote.”308 Further, the supreme court rejected the
city’s argument that a mandamus proceeding to compel public officials to
act on a referendum petition cannot originate in an appellate court.309
Finally, the supreme court stated,
Under the circumstances here, the Relators do not have an adequate
remedy by appeal because the appellate process will not resolve the
case in time for the referendum to be placed on the November 2015
ballot. . . . Under such circumstances, mandamus has long been rec-
ognized as an appropriate remedy when city officials improperly re-
fuse to act on a citizen-initiated petition.310
The supreme court conditionally granted Woodfill’s petition for writ of
mandamus and stated (1) “[a]ny enforcement of the ordinance shall be
suspended”; and (2) “[i]f the City Council does not repeal the ordinance
by August 24, 2015 . . . the City Council must order that the ordinance be
put to popular vote during the November 2015 election.”311
V. TEXAS SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO ADDRESSING
ADEQUATE REMEDY
As described above, the level of the Texas Supreme Court’s analysis
respecting the element of lack of an adequate remedy by appeal varies.
The chart below groups the cases described above by the level of analysis
respecting that element.
307. Id. at 476.
308. Id. at 478 (emphasis removed).
309. Id. at 481.
310. Id. at 480–81. Cf. In re Dorn, 471 S.W.3d 823, 824–25 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceed-
ing) (Brown, J., concurring as to order issued without opinion) (mandamus relief denied
where relators seeking to amend city charter offered no explanation for failure to diligently
pursue remedies available to them).
311. In re Woodfill, 470 S.W.3d at 481. The same ordinance was subsequently addressed
again by the supreme court on mandamus in In re Williams, 470 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. 2015)
(per curiam) (orig. proceeding). Because In re Williams did not involve any proceeding in a
lower court, that case is not included in this section, but rather is addressed below. See
infra note 360–70.
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Table
Appellate Remedy Subject Matter of Case & Act Mandamus
Treatment Opinion Constituting Abuse of Discretion Disposition
Specific discussion of In re Ford Motor Co., Forum Non Conveniens: No abuse of Denied
adequacy of party’s 442 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. discretion because wrongful death
appellate remedy 2014) plaintiffs were entitled to “Texas-resident
exception” to forum non conveniens
statute
In re Essex Ins. Co., Direct Action Against Insurer: Trial court Granted
450 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. (t. ct.) abused discretion by improperly
2014) (per curiam) refusing to dismiss direct claims brought
by insured against insurer before liability
was established
In re Conner, 458 Want of Prosecution: T ct. abused Granted
S.W.3d 532 (Tex. discretion by refusing to dismiss claims
2015) (per curiam) arising from vehicle accident for want of
prosecution after unexplained delay
In re Woodfill, 470 Performance of Ministerial Duty: City Granted
S.W.3d 473 (Tex. improperly refused to fulfill ministerial
2015) (per curiam) duty to repeal “equal rights” ordinance or
submit it to popular vote
Conclusory In re State Bar of Regulation of Practice of Law: T. ct. Granted
statement as to Texas, 440 S.W.3d abused discretion by denying disciplinary
adequacy of 621 (Tex. 2014) commission’s request to use expunged
appellate remedy records in attorney disciplinary action
In re Mem’l Hermann Discovery: T. ct. abused discretion by Granted
Hosp. Sys., 464 ordering hospital to disclose privileged
S.W.3d 686 (Tex. documents during discovery in lawsuit
2015) filed by surgeon
Adequacy of In re Fisher, 433 Standing: No abuse of discretion where t. Denied
appellate remedy not S.W.3d 523 (Tex. ct. denied plea to jurisdiction based on
addressed, but 2014) lack of standing in lawsuit by limited
case(s) cited partner against oil company
In re Ford Motor Co., Discovery: T. ct. abused discretion by Granted
427 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. ordering overly expansive discovery as to
2014) (per curiam) bias of experts in design defect case
In reWhataburger Motion for New Trial: T. ct. in premises Granted
Rest. LP, 429 S.W.3d liability case abused discretion by granting
597 (Tex. 2014) (per new trial based on juror misconduct
curiam) where no probable injury shown
In re Health Care Motion for New Trial: T. ct. in negligence Granted
Unlimited, Inc., 429 case abused discretion by granting new
S.W.3d 600 (Tex. trial based on juror misconduct where no
2014) (per curiam) probable injury shown
In re Vaishangi, 442 Enforcement of Settlement: T. ct. abused Granted
S.W.3d 256 (Tex. discretion by granting motion to enforce
2014) (per curiam) settlement agreement in lawsuit by
borrower against lender because plenary
power had expired
In re Nat’l Lloyds Discovery: T. ct. abused discretion by Granted
Ins. Co., 449 S.W.3d ordering overly broad discovery in lawsuit
486 (Tex. 2014) (per by insured against property insurer
curiam)
In re Crawford & Workers’ Compensation: T. ct. abused Granted
Co., 458 S.W.3d 920 discretion by not dismissing claims that
(Tex. 2015) (per fell within exclusive jurisdiction of Texas
curiam) Division of Workers’ Compensation
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In re Bridgestone Forum Non Conveniens: T. ct. abused Granted
Americas Tire discretion by refusing to dismiss wrongful
Operations, LLC, 459 death claim by two nonresident minors on
S.W.3d 565 (Tex. forum non conveniens grounds
2015)
In re Lipsky, 460 Texas Citizens’ Participation Act: No Denied
S.W.3d 579 (Tex. abuse of discretion where t. ct. denied
2015) plaintiff’s motion to dismiss counterclaims
based on anti-SLAPP law
In re Longview Discovery: No abuse of discretion by ct. Denied
Energy Co., 464 of appeals in affirming t. ct.’s discovery
S.W.3d 353 (Tex. order in case involving unjust enrichment
2015) claim against oil company
State v. Naylor, 466 Intervention After Final Judgment: Petition Denied
S.W.3d 783 (Tex. for writ of mandamus denied because
2015) relator did not first present petition to
court of appeals or state compelling
reason for not doing so
Royston, Rayzor, Arbitration: Because t. ct.’s denial of Denied
Vickery & Williams, motion to compel arbitration in client’s
LLP v. Lopez, 467 malpractice lawsuit against law firm was
S.W.3d 494 (Tex. reversed and remanded, corresponding
2015) petition for writ of mandamus was denied
In re Dow, 481 Regulation of Practice of Law: Supreme Dismissed
S.W.3d 215 (2015) court’s authority to regulate practice of for Lack
(per curiam) law does not confer authority to issue writ of
of mandamus against court of criminal Jurisdiction
appeals.
Adequacy of In re Doe, 444 Discovery: T. ct. abused discretion by Granted
appellate remedy not S.W.3d 603 (Tex. permitting pre-suit discovery as to identity
addressed, no case 2014) of potential defendant because  no
cited personal jurisdiction over him
In re Office of the “Authority” on Family Code Matter: T. ct. Granted
Attorney Gen., 456 abused discretion by ordering OAG to
S.W.3d 153 (Tex. remove family violence indicator from
2015) (per curiam) father’s OAG file
As shown in the chart, during the Survey period, out of the twenty-one
supreme court opinions that addressed the availability of mandamus
relief to correct a clear abuse of discretion by a lower court when there is
no adequate remedy by appeal, four contain a specific discussion
respecting the adequacy of an appellate remedy.312 In two others, the
supreme court made a conclusory statement as to adequacy of an
appellate remedy.313 The remaining fifteen cases do not address the
adequate remedy element. However, (1) in six of those fifteen cases, the
petition for mandamus relief was denied or dismissed without reaching
the adequate remedy requirement;314 (2) in seven of the remaining nine
312. See In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding);
In re Woodfill, 470 S.W.3d at 480–81; In re Ford Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex.
2014) (orig. proceeding); In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam)
(orig. proceeding).
313. See In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 719 (Tex. 2015) (orig.
proceeding); In re State Bar of Texas, 440 S.W.3d 621, 627 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding).
314. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 597 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); In re
Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d 353, 354 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); State v. Naylor,
466 S.W.3d 783, 783 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); In re Dow, 481 S.W.3d 215, 226 (Tex.
2015) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP v.
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of those cases, the supreme court cited analogous cases in which
adequacy of an appellate remedy was addressed;315 and (3) in the other
two of the remaining nine cases, the facts are analogous to prior supreme
court cases in which adequacy of an appellate remedy was addressed.316
Thus, those opinions illustrate the continuing applicability of the supreme
court’s statement that “the adequacy of an appeal depends on the facts
involved in each case.”317
VI. OTHER TEXAS SUPREME COURT MANDAMUS
OPINIONS WITHIN SURVEY PERIOD318
A. SUPERSEDEAS
In re State Board for Educator Certification319 involved an attempt by
the Board to supersede the trial court’s decision to reverse the Board’s
revocation of a teaching certificate. The case arose when Erasmo Mon-
talvo filed suit to overturn the revocation of his teaching certification.
The trial court concluded “the Board’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious” and “issued a per-
Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 506 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d 523,
535 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding).
315. See In re Crawford, 458 S.W.3d 920, 928–29 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding) (citing In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 235 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2007) (orig.
proceeding); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)); In re
Bridgestone, 459 S.W.3d 565, 577 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Pirelli Tire,
Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., 247 S.W.3d 670, 679 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding)); In re Ford Motor
Co., 427 S.W.3d 396, 397 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Weir, 166
S.W.3d 861, 865 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, orig. proceeding) (per curiam)); In re Health
Care Unlimited, 429 S.W.3d 600, 602 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (citing In
re Toyota Motor Sales, 407 S.W.3d 746, 762 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re United
Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 688–89 (Tex. 2012); In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las
Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex. 2009)); In re Whataburger, 429 S.W.3d
597, 598 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Toyota Motor Sales, 407
S.W.3d at 762); In re Vaishangi, 442 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding) (citing In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605); In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co.,
449 S.W.3d 486, 488 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Deere, 299
S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding)).
316. See In re Office of the Attorney Gen., 456 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. 2015) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus because trial court “lacked authority” to
order OAG to remove family violence indicator); In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603, 611 (Tex.
2014) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus because trial court’s order exceeded its
authority under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202). The supreme court has held
mandamus relief is proper where a trial court issues an order beyond its jurisdictional
authority. In re Vaishangi, 442 S.W.3d at 261 (citing In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at
605). Also, the supreme court has concluded a “party to [a] Rule 202 proceeding has no
adequate remedy on appeal if [a trial] court abused its discretion in ordering discovery that
would compromise procedural or substantive rights.” In re Does, 337 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex.
2011) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 420 (Tex.2008)
(orig. proceeding)); see In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d 932, 933 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding).
317. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
318. Due to their factual or procedural posture, these cases involved either no alleged
abuse of discretion by a lower court or no consideration of the adequacy of a remedy by
appeal.
319. 452 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (Justice Willett authored the opin-
ion, and Justice Guzman rendered a concurrence).
2016] Mandamus Decisions 301
manent injunction prohibiting the Board from ‘treating as revoked or re-
voking’ Montalvo’s certification.”320 Further, after Montalvo posted
security with the trial court, that court ordered that “pursuant to Rule
24.2(a)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure . . . any appeal
taken of this Judgment . . . will not supersede this Judgment during the
pendency of such appeal.”321 “The Board appealed the trial court’s revo-
cation reversal and separately sought mandamus relief challenging the
trial court’s denial of supersedeas.”322 The court of appeals, however, de-
nied mandamus relief and abated the merits of the Board’s appeal pend-
ing the Texas Supreme Court’s resolution of the “narrow procedural issue
[of] whether the trial court had discretion to deny suspension of its
judgment.”323
In addressing the Board’s request for a writ of mandamus, the supreme
court observed (1) Rule 24.2(a)(3) provides that “[w]hen, as here, the
judgment is not for money or property, the judgment creditor can post
security that gives the trial court discretion to ‘decline to permit the judg-
ment to be superseded’”;324 (2) under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code § 6.001, “[g]overnmental entities, like the Board, are exempt from
bond requirements”;325 (3) Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(h)
states that “[e]nforcement of a judgment can proceed unless the judg-
ment is suspended” by posting security pursuant to the rules of appellate
procedure, or “the appellant is entitled to supersede the judgment with-
out security by filing a notice of appeal”;326 and (4) “[t]his is our first
opportunity to squarely address which rule trumps.”327 After substantial
analysis, the supreme court rejected the Board’s argument that Rule
25.1(h) removes a trial court’s discretion to deny supersedeas under
[Rule] 24.2(a)(3).328 The supreme court stated, “The Board may appeal
without security—this is undisputed—but it has no unqualified right to
supersedeas in light of the trial court’s discretion under [Rule] 24.”329
Accordingly, the Board’s petition for writ of mandamus was denied.330
In the case of In re Corral-Lerma,331 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the
Texas Theft Liability Act constitutes compensatory damages for purposes
of calculating the security amount required for superseding enforcement
of a judgment. A contractor (Border Demolition) filed a lawsuit against
320. Id. at 803.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 803–04.
324. Id. at 804 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(3)).
325. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (West 2002)).
326. Id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(h)).
327. Id. at 805.
328. Id. at 808. The supreme court stated in a footnote, “We need not consider whether
the trial court abused its discretion under [Rule] 24.2(a)(3), because neither the Board nor
Montalvo raised that argument in this Court.” Id. at 808 n.37.
329. Id. at 808.
330. Id. at 809.
331. 451 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
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Eduardo Lerma to recover payment for demolition work it had per-
formed for Lerma. Subsequently, Lerma’s wife, Teresa Corral-Lerma,
“filed a separate suit against Border Demolition under the Texas Theft
Liability Act.”332 Border Demolition filed a counterclaim against Corral-
Lerma to recover attorney’s fees under that Act. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Border Demolition and awarded it
“$78,001 in attorney’s fees through trial and conditional fees for appeal,
as well as court costs and post-judgment interest.”333
“In lieu of a supersedeas bond, Coral-Lerma deposited $3,599.20, an
amount equal to the court costs awarded to Border Demolition.”334
“Border Demolition moved for a review and increase of the appellate
security,” which the trial court denied.335 On review of the sufficiency of
the security amount, the court of appeals granted Border Demolition’s
motion and held that an award of attorney’s fees under the Texas Theft
Liability Act “falls within the common definition of compensatory dam-
ages” and therefore is properly included in determining the “amount of
security for money judgment” pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Rem-
edies Code § 52.006.336 Corral-Lerma then petitioned for writ of manda-
mus in the supreme court.337
Before the supreme court, Border Demolition acknowledged that sub-
sequent to the issuing of the court of appeals’ opinion described above,
the Texas Supreme Court held in In re Nalle Plastics “that attorney’s fees
are neither compensatory damages nor costs for purposes of superseding
enforcement of a money judgment.”338 Border Demolition, however, ar-
gued (1) “an exception should apply under the Texas Theft Liability Act”
because that Act, unlike the statute at issue in In re Nalle Plastics, “pro-
vides for attorney’s fees even without an underlying damages recov-
ery”339 and therefore, according to the court of appeals, an attorney’s-
fees award under the theft liability act “is more like a compensatory-dam-
ages award”;340 (2) “failure to create an exception to Nalle Plastics under
the facts of this case allows Corral-Lerma to supersede the judgment . . .
during appeal with essentially no security against the risk of delay in en-
forcing the judgment”;341 and (3) “even if Corral-Lerma’s security
332. Id. at 386; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134.005(b) (West 2015).
333. In re Corral-Lerma, 451 S.W.3d at 386.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. Section 52.006 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides in rele-
vant part that “when a judgment is for money, the amount of security must equal the sum
of: (1) the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the judgment; (2) interest for the
estimated duration of the appeal; and (3) costs awarded in the judgment.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(a).
337. In re Corral-Lerma, 451 S.W.3d at 385; see TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4 (allowing for su-
preme court mandamus review of supersedeas rulings).
338. In re Corral-Lerma, 451 S.W.3d at 386 (citing In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd.
P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 176 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding)).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 387.
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amount need not cover the attorney’s-fees award, it nonetheless must in-
clude interest on those fees” because § 52.006 requires security covering
the “interest for the estimated duration of the appeal.”342
The supreme court rejected all three arguments. First, the supreme
court stated that the “statutory distinction” described by Border Demoli-
tion “does not undermine the inherent differences between compensa-
tory damages and attorney’s fees we acknowledged in Nalle Plastics.”343
Second, as to the alleged unfair risk complained of by Border Demoli-
tion, the supreme court stated in part (1) “under the scheme the legisla-
ture enacted, Border Demolition is hardly alone”; and (2) “[i]t is the
legislature’s prerogative to strike that balance and our duty to enforce the
statute as we find it.”344 Finally, the supreme court reasoned that (1) prior
to the enactment of § 52.006, “the security amount was required to cover
the entire amount of a money judgment, court costs, and interest”; and
(2) “[i]t is unreasonable to construe [§ 52.006] to require interest on cate-
gories of a judgment the Legislature specifically sought to exclude from
the security amount.”345 The supreme court conditionally granted manda-
mus relief and directed the court of appeals “to withdraw its order grant-
ing Border Demolition’s motion to increase the amount of security
required to supersede the trial court’s judgment against Corral-Lerma
pending appeal.”346
As described above, In re Longview Energy Co.347 involved a petition
for mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme Court respecting both the
posting of supersedeas security and a discovery order pursuant to Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, which governs suspension of enforce-
ment of judgments pending appeal in civil cases. As to the security order,
the supreme court observed that pursuant to § 52.006(a) of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code348 and Texas Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 24,349 the security posted “[t]o suspend the execution of a money
judgment on appeal” must cover compensatory damages.350 The supreme
342. Id.
343. Id. at 386–87.
344. Id. at 387.
345. Id. The supreme court specifically disapproved of two prior court of appeals opin-
ions “to the extent they hold that a security amount must include interest on attorney’s
fees or any other category of a judgment not required to be included in the security
amount.” Id. at 387–88 (disapproving, in part, Tex. Standard Oil & Gas, L.P. v. Frankel
Offshore Energy, Inc., 344 S.W.3d 628, 629 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.] 2011, order
[mand. denied]); Shook v. Walden, 304 S.W.3d 910, 929 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet.
denied)).
346. Id. at 388 (citing In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 176 (Tex.
2013) (orig. proceeding)).
347. 464 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). For a description of the facts in this
case, see supra notes 230–39 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 335.
349. Rule 24.2(a)(1) states in part, “When the judgment is for money, the amount of the
bond, deposit, or security must equal the sum of compensatory damages awarded in the
judgment, interest for the estimated duration of the appeal, and costs awarded in the judg-
ment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2 (a)(1).
350. In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d at 355.
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court noted that while the defendants contended the judgment’s mone-
tary award of future production revenues and an additional $95.5 million
did not constitute as compensatory damages, plaintiff Longview argued
that “the award is not punitive and therefore must be compensatory.”351
In rejecting Longview’s position, the supreme court stated in part (1)
“Longview offers no explanation for what the [$95.5 million] figure repre-
sents”; (2) “[w]e cannot conclude that the award is compensatory when it
cannot be explained”; and (3) “the award bears no resemblance to any
recognized form of damages.”352 The supreme court concluded that “[i]n
no sense can the monetary award in Longview’s judgment be said to be
compensatory damages” and the defendants therefore were “not re-
quired to post security for those amounts.”353 Thus, the supreme court
reasoned, it “need not consider whether the court of appeals correctly
applied the cap on security pursuant to Section 52.006(b) and Rule
24.2(a)(1).”354 Accordingly, without addressing adequacy of an appellate
remedy, the supreme court denied mandamus relief as to the security
order.355
B. MANDATORY VENUE
As described above, the mandamus relief requested in In re Fisher356
included relief from the trial court’s refusal to transfer claims pursuant to
venue selection clauses in several agreements signed by the parties at the
time plaintiff Richey sold his oil company to defendants. Each of those
agreements contained a clause stating that actions “arising out of or relat-
ing to” those agreements may be brought in Tarrant County and were not
to be brought in any other court.357 Richey, however, filed his claims de-
scribed above in Wise County, where he resided.
In their petition for mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme Court, de-
fendants contended that the trial court abused its discretion by not en-
forcing the parties’ “mandatory venue agreement under the major
transaction statute, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 15.020.”358
Richey argued that § 15.020 and the venue selection clauses in the agree-
351. Id. at 360.
352. Id. at 360–61.
353. Id. at 361.
354. Id. In reaching that conclusion, the supreme court cited In re Nalle Plastics Family
Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 174 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
355. Id. at 362. The supreme court also addressed the petition for mandamus relief as to
the discovery order. See supra notes 240–46 and accompanying text.
356. 433 S.W.3d 523, 528 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding). For a description of the facts of
this case, see supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
357. Id. at 531.
358. Id. at 527; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.020(c) (West Supp. 2015)
(“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this title, an action arising from a major transac-
tion may not be brought in a county if . . . the party bringing the action has agreed in
writing that an action arising from the transaction may not be brought in that county . . . or
. . . must be brought in another county of this state”); see also id. § 15.0642 (West 2002)
(specifically authorizing mandamus relief to enforce a statutory mandatory venue
provision).
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ments were inapplicable because (1) his claims did not arise from or re-
late to the transactions to which the venue agreements pertained; (2) “the
contractual venue selection clause [was] permissive, not mandatory”; and
(3) “venue [was] mandatory in Wise County” under a Civil Practice and
Remedies Code provision “requiring a suit for libel or slander to be
brought in the county where the plaintiff resided” at the time the cause of
action accrued.359 After extensive analysis focused on the substance of
Richey’s claims and the language of the applicable statutes, the supreme
court rejected all three of Richey’s arguments and conditionally granted
mandamus relief.360 The trial court was directed to vacate its order deny-
ing defendants’ motion to transfer venue and grant the venue motion.
C. CITY’S PERFORMANCE OF MINISTERIAL ELECTION DUTY
In re Williams361 required the Texas Supreme Court to address whether
the particular language on a ballot satisfied a city council’s ministerial
duty to submit an ordinance to popular vote. The case pertained to the
same City of Houston referendum petition at issue in the Woodfill case
described above,362 but involved a subsequent alleged abuse of discretion
by the Houston City Council rather than a review of a lower court ruling.
“Pursuant to a citizen-initiated referendum petition” respecting a contro-
versial equal rights ordinance, “the Houston City Council ordered that
the ordinance be submitted to voters in the upcoming November 2015
election.”363 Williams and other signers of the referendum petition (Rela-
tors) contested the wording of the issue on the ballot. Specifically, Rela-
tors contended that the city’s charter “requires a choice of ‘Yes’ or ‘No’
(or ‘For’ or ‘Against’) as to the ordinance itself,” but the wording used by
the City Council required voters to “choose between ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ re-
garding the repeal of the ordinance.”364
Without pursuing relief in the trial court or court of appeals, Relators
filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the supreme court, two days after
the complained-of ballot language was adopted by the city council. The
supreme court observed (1) it has jurisdiction under the Texas Election
Code to “issue a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any
duty imposed by law in connection with the holding of an election”;365
and (2) “[w]hen the law imposes a ministerial duty on the City Council
and the City Council does not comply, and there is no adequate remedy
by appeal, mandamus may issue.”366 Additionally, the supreme court
stated, “[W]e note ‘the imminence of the election places this case within
the narrow class of cases in which resort to the court of appeals is ex-
359. In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d at 529.
360. Id. at 529–34.
361. 470 S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
362. See supra notes 298–310 and accompanying text.
363. In re Williams, 470 S.W.3d at 820.
364. Id. at 822.
365. Id. at 821 (citing TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061).
366. Id. at 820.
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cused.’”367 The supreme court concluded the city had not complied with
its ministerial duty to submit the ordinance to an affirmative vote by the
people of Houston.368 Further, the supreme court rejected the city’s argu-
ment that “despite the short deadlines, a post-election election contest
provides an adequate remedy by appeal.”369 Rather, the supreme court
stated, “We have previously rejected this argument, holding that if ‘defec-
tive wording can be corrected’ prior to the election, then ‘a remedy will
be provided that is not available through a subsequent election con-
test.’”370 The supreme court conditionally granted mandamus relief and
directed the City Council to “word the proposition such that voters will
vote directly for or against the ordinance.”371
VII. CONCLUSION
The limited availability of mandamus relief has remained consistent
and warrants the continued characterization of such relief as an “ex-
traordinary remedy not issued as a matter of right.”372 Further, while the
Texas Supreme Court’s opinions in cases involving an alleged abuse of
discretion by a lower court and no adequate remedy on appeal vary in the
level of analysis of the adequacy of an appellate remedy, the supreme
court’s opinions from the past two years show that the supreme court
continues to focus on the specific facts of each case to determine whether
a remedy is adequate. Thus, reliance on a formulaic approach in such
cases is unlikely to be in a party’s best interest.
367. Id. at 821.
368. Id. at 823.
369. Id.
370. Id. (citing Blum v. Lanier, 997 S.W.2d 259, 264 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding)).
371. Id.
372. In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 374 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding).
